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Abstract 
This paper explores ways for the proposed LNG industry to build successful engagement 
procedures with BC First Nations. The process starts with the LNG industry’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility with regards to developing and maintaining a Social License to Operate. This 
paper provides an overview of the sociopolitical landscape in British Columbia, with a brief 
examination of Section 35 jurisprudence; fulfilling the requirements of Consultation & 
Accommodation when dealing with First Nations’ rights. As well, to enhance the LNG 
proponents’ engagement strategies there is a review of the current governance models that are 
available to First Nations.  Finally, this paper shows how the consensus approach to resolving 
multi-stakeholder issues can lead to the development of lasting relationships between the 
proposed LNG industry and the First Nations in BC.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Social License to Operate; Section 35 jurisprudence; 
Consultation & Accommodation; First Nations in BC  
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Glossary 
Term Definition 
Fiduciary An individual in whom another has placed the utmost trust and 
confidence to manage and protect property or money. The relationship 
wherein one person has an obligation to act for another's benefit 
 
 Court’s Fiduciary definition in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075: 
The Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with 
respect to aboriginal peoples.  The relationship between the Government 
and aboriginals is trust-like, rather than adversarial, and contemporary 
recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights must be defined in light of 
this historic relationship. 
Fracking  The process of injecting liquid at high pressure into subterranean rocks, 
boreholes, etc., so as to force open existing fissures and extract oil or 
gas. 
Honor of the Crown Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown 
requires negotiations leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims: 
R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 
  
Sui Generis A Latin phrase, meaning of its (his, her, or their) own kind; in a class by 
itself; unique 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
The intent of this paper is to provide the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) industry with 
guidelines for managing their relations with BC First Nations so the industry can continue their 
energy-based project development initiatives in British Columbia. I will achieve this by 
examining how Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is one avenue for managing their 
stakeholder relations and how understanding that social media connects stakeholders will allow 
the LNG proponents to develop a strategy to use the platforms to engage stakeholders. Unlike the 
majority of existing resource extractions in BC that are site specific, the LNG industry will be 
traversing the province with a significant amount of proposed resource developments to complete 
the LNG supply chain, and the Crown and Industry must have meaningful engagements with 
every First Nation community that will be impacted by the proposed LNG projects. The LNG 
industry will need to understand the evolution of the legal landscape in Canada with regards to 
modern Aboriginal law and how this shapes the procedural duties of the Consultation & 
Accommodation doctrine in BC. Reviewing the various governance models that First Nations can 
implement will provide the LNG industry proponents with an understanding of the socio-political 
dynamics that may be going on in the various First Nations communities they will encounter. 
This paper will then review the consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues, which 
can potentially be a process for the LNG industry to adopt. In the end this paper will provide the 
LNG Industry with an engagement framework which will not only create certainty for BC’s 
anticipated LNG resource developments but will result in lasting economic benefits for the LNG 
industry proponents and their partner First Nations in BC.  
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Background 
Currently, the world’s developed and developing nations rely on fossil fuels such as coal, 
petroleum, and natural gas for their energy needs. “In 2005 a whopping 86 percent of energy used 
worldwide came from fossil fuel combustion.”1 Fossil fuels are supplied by the capital intensive 
mining sector and “[e]nergy represents 25% of Canada’s total exports. At present, Canada 
depends almost entirely on the United States market for our energy exports.”2 The steady decline 
of America’s reliance on importing oil3 is the precursor for Canada to look to the world market 
for other countries to buy their energy resources: the “anticipated global trends mean declining 
U.S. demand for Canadian oil and natural gas and rapidly expanding opportunities for energy 
exports overseas, particularly in Asia.”4 For energy exports like Canadian natural gas5 to continue 
to be an important component of our economy, Canada will need to start building the necessary 
infra-structure to be able to move its land-locked energy resources to tidewater for export to the 
world’s markets. However, LNG projects are capital intensive and could cost anywhere between 
$ CAD 10-20 billion6 to build the entire value chain.7 
 
1 Energy and Global Warming article found at: 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/energy_and_global_warming/  
2 Eyford, Douglas. Forging Partnerships Building Relationships: Aboriginal Canadians and Energy 
Development. Report to the Prime Minister, November 29, 2013. At pg. 10. [hereinafter, “Eyford 
Energy”] 
3 In 2005, the U.S. relied on foreign oil for 60% of its daily consumption. By 2011, that had dropped to 
45%, and is projected to fall further, to 34% in 2019 [due to] Shale oil being successfully mined” Found 
at: http://useconomy.about.com/od/suppl1/f/Shale_Oil.htm. 
4 Eyford Energy, Supra, note 2 at pg. 10 
5 The focus of this paper will be on the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) plans that the Province of B.C. is 
developing. 
6 The cost for an entire LNG value chain would be anywhere from 10-20 Billion: where the Upstream gas 
extraction (Approx. 30%), Liquefaction and storage (50%), Shipping (Approx. 12%) and Regasification 
(Approx. 8%). 
LNG facilities are expensive to build because all equipment must meet high safety standards and because 
many costly components, including large amounts of stainless steel, are needed to resist the embrittling 
effects of extreme cold. The liquefaction plant is the most expensive part, costing $1-2 billion or more 
depending on the size and location. The cost of receiving terminals varies widely, from about $500 
million to $2 billion, depending on factors such as the number of storage tanks. LNG tankers cost $150 
million or more. In addition, there are high energy and maintenance costs for the liquefaction plants, plus 
significant operating costs for the ships and terminals. Aboriginal Pipeline Group: Natural Gas Facts 
found at: http://www.mvapg.com/natural-gas-lng.php 
7 The value chain provides a rigorous way to understand the sources of buyer value. Porter, Michael E. 
(1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance. New York.: Simon and 
Shuster.  
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The British Columbia government considers that “fracking” will be able to unlock the 
potential natural gas reserves in the province.8 The recent discoveries in British Columbia’s Horn 
River, the Liard and Cordova gas plays and the Alberta’s Montney gas plays where the “natural 
gas potential is estimated at over 2,933 trillion cubic feet mean LNG has the potential to become 
a leading commodity for British Columbia’s International Exports. To put it in perspective, each 
year industry extracts about 4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.”9The British Columbia 
government believes that “[t]he potential LNG export industry is a generational opportunity to 
enable strong economic growth and provide excellent employment opportunities throughout 
B.C.”10 To make the most of the LNG potential in BC means bringing in international 
corporations; those have expertise in the extraction of this provincial resource.  
Moreover, the proposed LNG proponents will have to pay special attention to the socio-
political climate in BC because having government support for big energy companies to develop 
the natural gas resource in BC is only one part of the process to build the natural gas supply 
chain. This is due to the fact that the provincial government only provides regulatory licenses to 
resource extraction companies to operate, but cannot guarantee the support of stakeholders 
affected by the operations of these companies. This chapter will review Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR)11 practices to demonstrate how they can become the basis for the proposed 
LNG industry proponents to engage and gain the permission of the various stakeholders12 in the 
areas of BC in which they plan to operate. This segment will then demonstrate how social media 
tools can connect the various stakeholders in BC and how social media can also become a tool for 
the LNG proponents to engage stakeholders. This segment will conclude with a review of the 
 
8 LNG Pipeline Map see Appendix A – Map provided by the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council 
9 Everything you want to know about LNG in BC. BC Government Website found at: 
http://engage.gov.bc.ca/lnginbc/b-c-s-lng-story/#environmental-leadership 
10 B.C.’s Natural Gas Sector: Significant Opportunities for Growth found 
at:http://engage.gov.bc.ca/bcjobsplan/files/2014/09/3yearUpdate_NaturalGas.pdf 
11 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) may be viewed as an umbrella term because as corporations adapt 
to meet the ever-changing atmosphere within which they operate so will the CSR definition be modified 
to keep up with the innovative solutions developed by industry.   
12 Stakeholders are external change agents and can be: politicians, bureaucrats, investors, consultants, 
suppliers, sub-contractors, financial analysts, social and ecological activists as well as, key stakeholders 
such as community groups, consumers and regulators. 
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Haisla First Nation’s LNG agreement to provide contextual evidence on how the future LNG 
proponents can work with BC’s First Nations.  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 Clearly, the doctrine of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)13 has been around for a 
number of years because Milton Friedman claims in a 1970, article that;  
…there is one and only one social responsibility of business- to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception and 
fraud.14 
Friedman even goes on to state that CSRs “...are notable for their analytical looseness and lack of 
rigor.”15 Equally, the “lack of rigor” is what allows corporations enough flexibility to voluntarily 
create innovative CSR initiatives or policies that will fit their enterprise to generate benefits for 
any corporation or organization and society. Businesses may opt to follow any one of the four 
prevailing justifications for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and use: moral obligation, 
sustainability, license to operate and reputation.”16 Probably the most prevalent CSR approach is 
sustainability because companies are voluntarily practicing the triple bottom line where people, 
planet and profits are used to assess their operation.17 However, this section will focus on how the 
 
13 Corporate Social Responsibility Evolution of a Definitional Construct. “In this article, the author traces 
the evolution of the CSR construct beginning in the 1950s, which marks the modern era of CSR. 
Definitions expanded during the 1960s and proliferated during the 1970s. In the 1980s, there were fewer 
new definitions, more empirical research, and alternative themes began to mature.” Carroll, Archie B. 
Corporate Social Responsibility Evolution of a Definitional Construct. BUSINESS & SOCIETY, Vol. 38 
No. 3, September 1999 found at: http://molar.crb.ucp.pt/cursos/2%C2%BA%20Ciclo%20-
%20Mestrados/Gest%C3%A3o/201315/EERS_1315/2Sess%C3%A3o%20dia%201%20Fevereiro/Artigo
s%20para%20mestrandos%20recensionarem/CSR%20%20Evolution%20of%20a%20definitional%20co
nstruct%20-%201999.pdf 
14 The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Profits. Milton Friedman. The New York Times 
Magazine. September 13, 1970. Copyright@1970 by The New York Times Company  Found at: 
http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html 
15 Ibid 
16 Porter, Michael E. and Mark R. Kramer. Strategy and Society: the link between competitive advantage 
and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review. December 2006. Found at: 
https://hbr.org/2006/12/strategy-and-society-the-link-between-competitive-advantage-and-corporate-
social-responsibility 
17 From Business 660 Sustainability class notes.  
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best CSR approach for the proposed LNG industry in BC is the Social License to Operate18 
because this policy allows corporations to adapt to the changes that stakeholders are creating in 
the social and political fields in which they will operate.  
Evidently, CSR has critics because there are times when the CSR policy has provisions 
that cannot be adequately measured as in the case of sustainability: 
[The problem with] the triple bottom line is that the three separate accounts cannot be 
easily added up. It is difficult to measure the planet and people accounts in the same 
terms as profits- that is, in terms of cash.19  
Also corporations may even misrepresent their sustainability efforts and this is known as 
“greenwashing”.20 But, these problems can be overcome by having credible third parties validate 
their business’ training and development, for example the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) offers training in a wide variety of subjects in order to meet organizational 
requirements in an ever-shifting business setting. 
The proposed LNG industry in BC should look at business’ training and development by 
taking standards and certification programs from a credible and external third party. Undertaking, 
the ISO 26000:2010 Corporate Responsibility program will show the various stakeholders they 
are training their people to maintain CSR in their day-today business activities.21  
[B]ecause there is no specific external reward- certification- explicitly tied to ISO 
26000. ISO recommends users say for example that they have used ISO 26000 as 
a guide to integrate social responsibility into our values and practices.”22  
 
18 “The concept of a Social license to Operate (SLO) was first proposed by Jim Cooney 1997 as an essential 
requirement for the future survival of the mining industry.” Corporate Social Responsibility- The Social 
Licence to Operate a Mine. The International Resource Journal. Monday, May 4, 2015. Found at: 
http://www.internationalresourcejournal.com/mining/mining_november_12/the_social_licence_to_operat
e_a_mine.html 
19 Triple bottom line it consists of three Ps; profit, people and planet. The Economist Nov. 17, 2009. found 
at: http://www.economist.com/node/14301663 
20 Greenwashing is the practice of making unsubstantiated or misleading claims about the environmental 
benefits of a product, service, a technology or company practice. Evidently, aspirational goals are 
expressed in 100% even though the organization may not be close to the 100% mark in its day-to-day 
actions. From Business 660 Sustainability class notes. 
21 ISO 26000:2010 found at: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:26000:ed-1:v1:en 
22 Definition found at: http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_26000 
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Having ISO offer Corporate Responsibility training illustrates the fact that organizations 
and corporations around the globe are currently expected to act in socially responsible way.  
[The ISO 26000 Social Responsibility] standard was launched in 2010 following five 
years of negotiations between many different stakeholders across the world. 
Representatives from government, NGOs, industry, consumer groups and labour 
organizations around the world were involved in its development, which means it 
represents an international consensus.23  
Plus having an international consensus on CSR means more companies and organizations will be 
incorporating CSR into their operating policies in response to greater scrutiny by various direct 
and indirect stakeholders.  
Another way for the LNG companies to meet stakeholders’ concerns is to join a national 
program like the Canadian Business for Social Responsibility (CBSR) which is “a non-profit 
member organization with a mission to accelerate and scale corporate social and environmental 
sustainability in Canada and challenge the "business as usual" model.”24 Joining a national 
organization similar to CBSR will provide guidance and support for any of the LNG proponents 
that become members and use CBSR to develop a Corporate Social Responsibility policy. 
Because CBSR provides their members with Good Company Guidelines and:  
assistance to member companies seeking to implement policies and practices which 
contribute to the long term, sustained and responsible success of their business while 
balancing the claims of key stakeholders, investors, employees, customers, business 
partners, communities and the environment.25    
The CBSR members are confident that their Good Company Guidelines provide a framework that 
any organization can use regardless of size.26 The CBSR’s goals allow this to be a suitable 
program for any of the proposed LNG companies planning to operate in BC. 
 
23 ISO 26000:2010 found at:  http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm 
24 Founded in 1995 Canadian Business for Social Responsibility (operating as CBSR) is a non-profit 
member organization and the CBSR information page is found at: http://www.cbsr.ca/ 
25 Good Company: Guidelines for Corporate Social Performance Found at: 
http://www.cbsr.ca/sites/default/files/GoodCompany-SummaryDocument.pdf [hereinafter, ‘Good 
Company”] 
26 Ibid 
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Moreover, “[c]ompanies have traditionally considered as stakeholders their shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, business partners, and other key influencers.”27 On the other 
hand, the CBSR provides the broadest definitions for stakeholders because their definition is  
any person, group, or entity that is impacted directly or indirectly by a business’ activities 
or that directly or indirectly impacts the business’ activities. This includes but is not 
limited to community members, employees and their families, customers, suppliers, 
shareholders, community and environment groups, politicians, professional and academic 
organizations, the biosphere, world population, and future generations.28 
This all-inclusive list of stakeholders shows that the CBSR clearly appreciates how significant the 
stakeholders’ role is in the day-to-day activities of any organization. And, the CBSR believes, “if 
a sufficient number of companies adopt these guidelines, they could provide a common language 
between customers, suppliers, regulators, and other stakeholders for discussion and information 
sharing.”29 This demonstrates the need for a common platform to increase the understanding 
between stakeholders and the LNG proponents. With the CBSR including future generations this 
appears to align with First Nations’ values although they would not define themselves as 
stakeholders. Since, Aboriginal communities have been here since time immemorial, Aboriginals 
or First Nations are more than stakeholders as they have a special constitutionally recognized 
standing in Canada as per Section 35 of the Constitution30.  That is why when industry or the 
Crown engages with Aboriginal groups, it is best not to refer to Aboriginals as stakeholders but 
rather give the recognition of their unique status as per Section 3531 and refer to them as “rights 
holders”.  
The usual role of government agencies is to deliver regulations for companies to follow, 
but even Canada’s Federal government supports the CSR approach with how it expects the 
extractive sector to operate internationally.32 The Federal government outlines this understanding 
 
27 Bekefi, Tamara, Beth Jenkins, and Beth Kytle. 2006. “Social Risk as Strategic Risk.” Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 30. Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University. found at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/publications/workingpaper_30_bekefietal.pdf [hereinafter, “Social Risk”] 
28 Good Company, Supra, note 25 
29 Good Company, Supra, note 25 
30 For further analysis of Section 35 of the Constitution , See text accompanying note 131 
31 Ibid 
32 Because the resource extraction industry is an inherently dirty business Canada’s Federal government 
should have CSR guidelines for all domestic resource extraction operations.  
 8 
in their “2009, launch of Canada’s first CSR strategy, “Building the Canadian Advantage: A 
Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy for the Canadian Extractive Sector Abroad.”33 Also, part 
of Canada’s Federal government strategy’s outcome is implementing how CSR is “defined as the 
voluntary activities undertaken by a company over and above legal requirements, to operate in an 
economically, socially and environmentally sustainable manner.”34 Canada’s CSR strategy clearly 
shows the expectation of the voluntary participation of the extractive sector companies to act over 
and above legal requirements. But, Canada’s CSR strategy also penalizes the extractive sector 
companies that do not meet the best practices. 
Canadian companies found not to be embodying CSR best practices and who refuse to 
participate in dispute resolution processes contained in the CSR Strategy, will no longer 
benefit from economic diplomacy of this nature. Furthermore, such a designation will be 
taken into account in the CSR-related evaluation and due diligence conducted by the 
Government of Canada’s financing crown corporation, Export Development Canada 
(EDC), in its consideration of the availability of financing or other support.35  
Moreover, Canada’s CSR guidelines go on to illustrate how challenging the international 
arena can be for the extractive sector and describe it as follows: 
given the challenging environments in which the extractive sector operates, disputes can 
and do arise. Disagreements can divide communities, keep them from obtaining 
resolutions to their concerns, and can create a negative cycle of disputes, limiting the 
community’s access to the benefits of natural resource development. Unresolved 
disagreements with communities can also affect businesses through expensive project 
delays, damaged reputations, high conflict management costs, investor uncertainty, and in 
some cases, the loss of investment capital.36 
The numerous ideologies of the various stakeholders makes the political environment that the 
proposed LNG industry will encounter in BC similar to the international arena. By understanding 
the socio-political dynamics of doing business in the international markets “Canada has a 
multifaceted approach to help Canadian extractive companies mitigate social and environmental 
risks and improve their CSR performance, as well as their contribution to host country benefits.”37 
 
33 Canada’s Enhanced Corporate Social Responsibility Strategy to Strengthen Canada’s Extractive Sector 
Abroad found at: http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-
domaines/other-autre/csr-strat-rse.aspx?lang=eng#5 
34 Ibid  
35 Supra, note 33 
36 Supra, note 33  
37 Supra, note 33 
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The risks present two issues that the proposed LNG industry in BC needs to address because 
“[s]ocial and environmental issues are emerging as troublesome sources of strategic risk”38 for 
corporations because they are “characterized by complex origins and equally complex, far 
reaching impacts.”39 Clearly, the LNG proponents will have to address the social and 
environmental issues associated with their industry and “acting beyond the minimum 
requirements of regulatory approvals is an important component of establishing a company’s 
long-term reputation and brand among stakeholders and communities.”40  
Noticeably, risk management is already part of any corporations’ existing operations but, 
“[t]raditional risk management programs focus on operational and compliance risks and are 
generally composed of point solutions: mitigation actions specific to particular sources or impacts 
of risk.”41 The proposed LNG industry in BC needs to develop their risk management programs 
beyond point solutions, because “the emergence of social risk is characterized by four 
components in combination: an issue, a stakeholder or group of stakeholders, a negative 
perception about the company, and the means to do damage.”42 Having four components working 
together to create social risk illustrates how complex this subject can be and “[g]iven the 
complexity that is characteristic of a strategic risk, social risk can arise in numerous ways.”43 On 
the other hand, “[m]any companies have, within their corporate social responsibility, public 
affairs, or other departments, the necessary capabilities and expertise to manage strategic risks 
stemming from social and environmental issues.”44 Basically, the proposed LNG industry in BC 
needs to understand the four components that give rise to the emergence of social risk and 
respond with a comprehensive solution that takes this into account. This means that an effective 
remedy will be outside of point solutions. 
 
38 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
39 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
40 Yates, Brian F. and Celesa L. Horvath. Social License to Operate: How to get it, and How to Keep it. 
Pacific Energy Summit 2013: Summit Working Papers. Found at: http://www.nbr.org. [hereinafter, “SLO 
how to keep”] 
41 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
42 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
43 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
44 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
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Further, the proposed LNG industry in BC will have to face the reality that “[i]t is time to 
think about a new expanded business ecosystem. Companies must begin to monitor, assess, and 
manage strategic risk and opportunity in the context of a broad suite of social and environmental 
issues and stakeholders.”45 In order to be successful the proposed LNG industry needs to be aware 
of the expanded business ecosystem in which they operate. And, that “[o]ne dimension of social 
risk’s complexity is that it is often a function of strategic or operational decisions companies have 
made that affect issues that stakeholders care about.”46 Understanding how their corporate 
decisions can create issues or social risks will allow them to use the capabilities they already have 
within their organization to resolve such issues. Indeed, “[a] strategic risk that is anticipated early 
and mitigated well can be converted into a new market, a competitive advantage, a stock of 
goodwill, or a strategic relationship.”47 
Additionally, this “multifaceted approach to help Canadian extractive companies mitigate 
social and environmental risks and improve their CSR performance” is coming from a 
government of Canada website for international business and is not on their Aboriginal 
engagement sites.48 The Federal government of Canada should be doing additional work to 
improve the socio-economic conditions and address the trepidations of BC First Nations in 
regards to the proposed LNG projects.  Even “[i]ndustry questions why Canada is not doing more 
to address unresolved Aboriginal rights claims in British Columbia, and why it does not engage 
with Aboriginal groups on project development in advance of or outside regulatory processes.”49 
Beyond the questions, the LNG proponents should insist that Canada and BC start working in 
 
45 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
46 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
47 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
48 The interesting take-away from this is that the BC First Nations’ aspirational goals are to have nation-to-
nation dialogues about resource development with Canada in their respective traditional territories and 
this really does not take place. Let alone dealing with the larger issue of the reconciliation of their 
outstanding land claims in BC. 
49 Eyford. Energy, Supra, note 2  
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collaboration with BC’s First Nations to work on lasting reconciliation agreements that will 
increase the level of certainty for the proposed LNG industry’s projects.50   
The Social Licence 
Remarkably, the proposed LNG industry in BC is closing in on:  
“a time when access to international markets remains the sector's biggest problem, and 
the eyes of the world focus on how Canada relates to its First Nations peoples, replacing 
a still largely one-sided, outdated approach to CSR with one focused on mutual respect 
and shared value offers a unique opportunity to earn not only the social licence to 
operate, but also enormous economic and social returns—and the trust and respect of an 
increasingly skeptical public.”51 
“The term, “social license to operate”52 or “social license,” generally refers to a local 
community’s acceptance or approval of a company’s project or ongoing presence in an area.”53 
This is outside of the regulatory compliance of a corporation because social license is not given 
by a government. And, the “process of acquiring social license demands early and ongoing 
investment of effort by proponents to develop and maintain social capital within the context of 
trust-based relationships with aboriginal people, local communities, and other interested 
groups.”54  
 
50 The Federal and Provincial governments appear to be making decisions that make it easier for LNG 
companies to come to Canada. “In 2012, Petronas purchased Calgary-based Progress Energy for $5.5 
billion…At first Ottawa rejected the takeover, saying it wasn't in Canada's best "net interest" for one 
foreign firm to mine unconventional gas, liquefy it, and then export the fractured gas to Asia through its 
own terminals and ships. But Ottawa later approved the deal.” Nikiforuk, Andrew. Who Is BC's Big 
LNG Partner? A Petronas Primer: Group led by Malaysia's national oil company aims to build terminal 
near Prince Rupert. The Tyee: News. Culture Solutions, May 21, 2015. found at: 
http://thetyee.ca/News/2015/05/21/Who-Is-Petronas-LNG/  And,“The B.C. government, which wants to 
see three projects built by 2020, has lowered natural gas royalties, corporate taxes and LNG taxes to 
entice Asian investors.” Nikiforuk, Andrew.  BC LNG Lost Its Window of Opportunity, Study Finds: 
Projects unlikely to be economic for another decade: Oxford Institute energy report. The Tyee: News. 
Culture. Solutions. found at: http://thetyee.ca/News/2015/05/22/BC-LNG-Lost-Opportunity/ 
51 Avram, Joni. Reinventing Corporate Social Responsibility. Oilweek: Canada’s Oil and Gas Authority. 
Apr. 28, 2014 [hereinafter, “Reinventing CSR”] 
52 “The concept of a Social license to Operate (SLO) was first proposed by Jim Cooney 1997 as an essential 
requirement for the future survival of the mining industry.” Corporate Social Responsibility- The Social 
Licence to Operate a Mine. The International Resource Journal. Monday, May 4, 2015. Found 
at:http://www.internationalresourcejournal.com/mining/mining_november_12/the_social_licence_to_ope
rate_a_mine.html 
53 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
54 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
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“The challenge for corporations is that social license to operate is a subjective concept, 
not a piece of paper. There is no issuing organization or agency. The terms are different 
for every business and vary considerably, even within the same industry. Ultimately, 
SLO is based on who your stakeholders are and what they think of you.”55  
This issue may not be easy for the LNG proponents to address: “[o]ften intangible and informal, 
social license can nevertheless be realized through a robust suite of actions centered on timely 
and effective communication, meaningful dialogue, and ethical and responsible behavior.”56 The 
aforementioned presents guidelines to help explain what Social License to Operate is and how the 
LNG proponents need to effectively engage with various stakeholders to gain their SLO. In any 
event the LNG proponents need to also understand that the dynamics of a “[s]ocial license may 
manifest in a variety of ways, ranging from absence of opposition to vocal support or even 
advocacy, and these various levels of social license (as well as, of course, the absence of social 
license) may occur at the same time among different interested parties.”57 All of these differing 
stakeholders’ viewpoints combine to create a complex business ecosystem within the province of 
BC. 
The BC Stakeholders and Benefits of the Social License  
Evidently, as part of the new expanded business ecosystem “[o]rganisations can no 
longer choose if they want to engage with stakeholders or not; the only decision they need to take 
is when and how successfully to engage.”58 In order to do this the proposed LNG industry needs 
to fully appreciate the socio-political dynamics of the various BC communities and use this as the 
foundation for their engagements with the various stakeholders.  
“To be effective in terms of building social capital and social license, stakeholder 
engagement must be timely, inclusive, complete, and meaningful. Timelines refers to 
 
55Klein, Paul. Three Ways to Secure Your Social License to Operate in 2013.  Found at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2012/12/28/three-ways-to-secure-your-social-license-to-operate-in-
2013/ 
56 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
57 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
58 Jeffery, Neil. Stakeholder Engagement: A Road Map to Meaningful Engagement. #2 in the Doughty 
Centre ‘How to do Corporate Responsibility’ Series. July, 2009. found at: 
http://www.som.cranfield.ac.uk/som/dinamic-content/media/CR%20Stakeholder.pdf 
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ensuring that engagement commences before a stakeholder is affected by a corporation’s 
actions and continues until legitimate issues are resolved or the effect ceases.”59 
The BC LNG industry proponents will need to engage with each one of the local communities’ 
stakeholders prior to them being affected by the LNG proponents’ activities. And, the broadest 
possible conception of “stakeholder”60 is required because “the scope and depth of engagement 
may vary by stakeholder group, corporations must recognize that stakeholders will self-identify. 
Thus, there is rarely any legitimate basis for choosing to exclude a stakeholder group from 
engagement.”61 The LNG industry proponents need to also maintain an understanding that the 
circumstances can vary considerably from one community to the next. “These regional and 
cultural differences demand a flexible and responsive approach and must be understood early in 
order to enable the development and implementation of an effective strategy to earn and maintain 
social license”62 for the proponents of the proposed BC LNG industry. 
Since the BC “stakeholders can range from indigenous peoples with ancient claims to 
traditional use and occupation of the land to outside environmental groups who are interested in 
the project because of conservation goals.”63 These two stakeholders can have quite an impact on 
the proposed LNG pipeline project because as it traverses the province it will cross numerous 
First nations’ traditional territories and impact numerous ecosystems. The LNG industry will 
need to develop effective strategies to meet the needs of these two groups as they will be at the 
forefront of community engagements.  
On the one hand, the BC First nations have assorted political alliances and diverse local 
traditions. The new companies coming to BC to start their LNG operations may want to look to 
another energy company to see what their policy is with regards to First Nations. Enbridge has a 
policy that “lays out key principles for Aboriginal relations, such as respect for traditional ways 
and land, heritage sites, the environment, and recognition of unique legal and constitutional 
 
59 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
60 Good Company, Supra, note 25 
61 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
62 Gaurangkumar, Barot C. Cost benefit analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Advances In 
Management. Vol. 8 (5) May (2015). found at: http://shankargargh.org/mngmntcurrissue/2.pdf 
63 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
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rights.”64 The Enbridge policy reflects the unique socio-political positions that BC First Nations 
currently hold and tries to mitigate the interactions. The proposed LNG industry will need to be 
prudent and gather as much relevant information as possible. This will help the LNG industry to 
develop their operating policies to address the unique socio-political environment in BC.  
Moreover, environmental groups have an interest in the BC LNG projects because 
“[w]ater, fugitive gas and seismic concerns weigh on the natural gas boom.”65 The LNG 
proponents should already have a profound understanding of the long-held concerns of the 
environmentalists because “[f]racking has serious environmental impacts, including the 
exploitation and contamination of freshwater resources, and greenhouse gas emissions (both of 
CO2 and methane)66 causing global warming.”67 Even though the environmentalists have 
apprehensions with the natural gas projects, they may not permanently reside in any of the local 
communities in BC. This illustrates the point that the LNG industry may have to contend with the 
transitory activist that can show up in any location and temporarily increase the local population’s 
opposition. This presents a problem for the LNG proponents because they may never be able to 
mitigate the environmentalists’ concerns for two reasons; environmentalists can be transient and 
move around the province, and using the principled approach or absolutist perspective where 
saving the Earth is the goal they will never yield their opposition to LNG development. Still, by 
examining just two BC stakeholders exemplifies a wide assortment of perspectives and ideologies 
that cannot be addressed with just one corporate undertaking. The proposed LNG proponents 
need to use a flexible and responsive approach in their development and implementation of an 
effective strategy to earn and maintain a social license in each one of BC’s communities. 
 
64 Enbridge.com site found at: http://enbridge.com/AboutEnbridge/CorporateSocialResponsibility/CR-
Policies.aspx 
65 Baird, Jim. Obtain and Maintain a Social License to Operate, or Turn Out the Lights. September 24, 
2013. found at: http://theenergycollective.com/jim-baird/239581/social-license-operate-required-or-else-
lights-go-out 
66 “Significant carbon dioxide is released from combustion to provide compression at liquefaction plants, to 
provide power aboard ships, and to re-gasify LNG at terminals and Methane is a greenhouse gas 21 times 
as potent as carbon dioxide.” Source is the Aboriginal Pipeline Group: Natural Gas Facts found at: 
http://www.mvapg.com/natural-gas-lng.php 
67 Sierra Club BC. Fracking and LNG: What is Fracking? found at: http://www.sierraclub.bc.ca/our-
work/mining-energy/fracking 
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Likewise, the LNG proponents should commit to taking appropriate measures to gain 
their Social License to Operate in the numerous BC communities for the following reasons: 
where stakeholder relationships are particularly strong, these bonds can sometimes be 
leveraged to engage other stakeholders or to overcome opposition. This can happen when 
relationships become sufficiently advanced that the manifest benefits cause the 
stakeholders to become advocates, instead of neutral parties or outright opponents.68  
Within the BC context leveraging the strong relationships with one stakeholder group to engage 
other stakeholders to overcome opposition is a benefit of gaining a Social License in one area. 
The LNG proponents should not overlook the fact that when they have taken appropriate 
measures to develop a stock of goodwill, and/or a strategic relationship with one stakeholder 
group in BC, it can help mitigate concerns in another area. Especially, when one considers how 
interconnected the BC First Nation communities are through familial ties and their social 
gatherings.  
Moreover, the Social License to Operate once achieved can continue to benefit the LNG 
proponents because it can have a positive influence over the various stakeholders in the following 
ways: 
Assures shareholders and investors that a company is managing social and other risks 
associated with its projects and activities: Minimizes the risks of costly delays in 
regulatory approvals due to opposition; Enhances trust by demonstrating to regulators 
and other stakeholders that the company is genuinely striving for good performance, and 
Protects a company’s reputation in times of crises.69  
 In addition to other benefits for the LNG proponents, a Social License to Operate will: “ensure a 
stable operating environment; enable faster permitting and approvals; strengthen reputation; and 
more effectively use corporate resources.”70  The Social License to Operate is worth pursuing 
because of the many benefits it will provide the LNG proponents. And, as noted earlier this 
“illustrates how the new expanded business ecosystem begins with monitoring, assessing, and 
 
68 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
69 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
70 Parker, AR, et al. Managing Risk and Maintaining License to Operate: Participatory Planning and 
Monitoring in the Extractive Industries. July 2008.  Found at: 
http://commdev.org/files/2037_file_Concept_Paper.pdf[hereinafter, “Managing Risk”] 
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managing strategic risk and opportunities in the context of a broad suite of social and 
environmental issues and stakeholders”71 to achieve the benefits of a Social License to Operate.  
In addition, the benefits of a Social License are not just one-sided because they can 
“positively impact host communities and companies themselves through increased morale, more 
productive employees, and long term benefits as a partner of choice. Thus there is a dual business 
case: increased productivity (value creation) plus risk mitigation (value protection).”72 But, as the 
LNG industry projects unfold and become operational, the LNG proponents will want to continue 
embarking on measures to maintain their Social License within each community. As a result 
“[t]he trust developed through effective engagement provides a crucial cushion for an 
organization facing any kind of crisis… such trust will buffer the company from an immediate 
loss of social license, provided that the company continues to effectively engage.”73 The LNG 
proponents’ effective engagement with stakeholders is essential to maintaining their Social 
License within each community. But understanding how technology is connecting stakeholders is 
yet another key element in developing the proponents’ overall understanding of the various 
stakeholders. 
Social Media Connects Stakeholders 
Prior to 1990, corporations really had no need to take any steps towards a Social License to 
Operate because most extraction sites were remote and far from mainstream society. But, now 
“[s]ocial license has gained importance in the extractive industries largely because of the 
explosion in information and communication technologies during the 1990s, which forever 
changed the context for extractive operations.”74 Clearly, the main change is that the remote 
communities are no longer isolated by geography: 
The Internet opened up unprecedented opportunities for communication across worlds 
that were previously exclusive of each other. Through an increasingly connected but 
decentralized media, host community images and concerns are amplified in the extractive 
industry’s home country and to global stakeholders. The ability of civil society to become 
 
71 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
72 Managing Risk Supra, note 70 
73 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
74Managing Risk Supra, note 70 
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networked from the local to the global, and vice versa, increases the operational and 
reputational risks of multinational corporations and changes the balance of power 
between firms and localities.75 
The current information76 and communication technologies allow people from all over the world 
to connect and access information. “Social media gives voice to previously isolated or remote 
stakeholders, who often come to the social media landscape with disproportionate credibility and 
trust, due in part to their perceived authenticity.”77 This just creates another concern for LNG 
proponents in the newly expanded business ecosystem because of the exposure to reputational 
risks.  
Nevertheless, the LNG proponents’ expanded business environment needs to include the 
impact of social media on the LNG proponents’ efforts to gain a Social License to Operate 
because a “significant factor affecting social license is the emergence of social media as a tool for 
communication, dialogue and activism.”78 In late 2012, people witnessed how social media can 
unite people across the country to join a political action group like the “Idle No More” movement 
which was started by four women from Saskatchewan. In fact, “[t]he first tweet sent with the 
“#IdleNoMore” hashtag was sent Nov. 4, by co-founder Jessica Gordon. Within a few weeks the 
political movement gained traction and #IdleNoMore was trending on twitter.”79 Another 
measurable outcome of their political action is the Idle No More Facebook group has around 
45,000 members and their purpose is "to support and encourage grassroots to create their own 
forums to learn more about Indigenous rights and our responsibilities to our Nationhood via 
teach-ins, rallies and social media."80 The aforementioned illustrates how just one of the LNG 
proponents’ focus groups has been able to use social media as a tool for communication, 
discourse and political action.  
 
75 Managing Risk, note 70 
76 Indeed,“[t]he lightning spread of communication technologies has enabled the dissemination of 
information ideas that mainstream media have been unwilling or unable to publish.” The Transformative 
Power of Online Activism. found at: http//www.hertieschool.org/mediaandevents/events/events-
pages/04052015-the-transformative-power-of-online-activism/ 
77 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
78 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
79 CBC News. “9 questions about Idle No More”. Jan. 05, 2013. found at: www.cbc.ca/news/canada/9-
questions-about-idle-no-more-1.1301843 
80 Ibid 
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Indeed, the use of any of the social media platforms can empower the various 
stakeholders in BC because they can quickly connect and share information on any topic that they 
feel is important.  
“Social media tools empower stakeholders and communities to access and share 
information on company behaviors, technologies, and projects as they are implemented 
around the world. Understanding and managing this reality will be important for 
companies seeking social license.”81  
The LNG proponents should not underestimate the power of social media due to the fact that 
“[t]oday, one blogger can reach as wide an audience as a large ad campaign. Where previously 
isolated issues and trends are no longer necessarily confined to a single region, discipline, or 
economic sector; rather, they spread and evolve quickly.”82 Any issue can grow using social 
media when the topic is centred on peoples’ opinions which warrant the attention of other 
stakeholders including “those who may be affected by or have an effect on an effort. They may 
also include people who have a strong interest in the effort for academic, philosophical, or 
political reasons.”83  
Certainly the ease of accessing information can empower individuals which in turn 
creates problems for the LNG proponents, because “[m]obile technologies make it much easier 
for stakeholders to quickly access information about companies and their behaviour, and social 
media makes it much easier for stakeholders to share information and their opinions – favourable 
or not – with their networks.”84 As a result, when any of the stakeholders’ issues remain 
unchecked or unaddressed by the corporation or in this situation an LNG proponents, the 
outstanding issues can attract more distant stakeholders, especially, when the stakeholders are 
using social media which: 
 
81 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
82 Social Risk, Supra, note 27 
83 Rabinowitz, Phil. How do you identify and analyze stakeholders and their interests? Section 8. 
Identifying and Analyzing Stakeholders and Their Interests. Community Tool Box. 2014. found at: 
http://ctb.ku.edu/en/table-of-contents/participation/encouraging-involvement/identify-stakeholders/main. 
84 Horvath, C. Social Media and the Extractive Sector: The changing currency of a modern license to 
operate. Canadian Institute of Mining Magazine. Sept/Oct 2011. Canadian Institute of Mining, 
Metallurgy and Petroleum. 2011 Found at: 
http://www.cim.org/en/PublicationsandTechnicalResources/Publications/CIMMagazine/SeptemberOctob
er2011/upfront/Social_media_and_the_extrative_sector.aspx [hereinafter,”Social Media/Extractive”] 
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allows users to self-organize quickly into communities with shared interests. Trust can 
also be generated rapidly within online communities, and such trust creates opportunities 
for collaboration and action much more quickly than would be possible through 
traditional engagement.85  
The social media tools not only allow the various stakeholders to take control of their message, 
but they are also able to establish their own networks and communities on the web, which helps 
them to gain support and find other like-minded collaborators to work with.  
 Social Media for the LNG Proponents 
The social media platforms can also be useful to the LNG proponents because they can 
connect to any one of the various stakeholders in BC that are online. However, for LNG 
proponents to make the best use of the social media platforms they will have to overcome many 
of their internal issues preventing their development of an effective social media strategy. As 
paraphrased from the “Five reasons corporations are failing at social media”86 are due to the 
following reasons:  
1. They cannot talk about anything broader than their own products: 
If a company is only talking online about its specific products and not looking for ways to 
connect to the bigger picture, It is difficult for people to be engaged. 
2. They listen to customers but do not take any action: 
If a company creates an online presence that is open and allows customer feedback, it 
creates the expectation that the company is going to do something with that feedback. 
“Worse than not being heard; is being heard and then ignored.” 
3. Corporations are not calibrated internally with the technology: 
Customers expect interaction. Content creation is the key to social media success, and 
every company should have a Web site with a content management system that allows for 
quick, easy content creation without the IT department needing to recode a Web site. 
And, companies cannot expect to have a strong social media presence when social sites 
are blocked internally to stop access by their employees. 
4. Their internal culture is not aligned for social media success: 
When policies, procedures, products and processes become more important than the 
customer, there is no way social media efforts can be effective. When your employees are 
more concerned doing what is in their job description than doing the right thing to help 
the customer that is not a culture that is likely to build trust and advocacy for your brand 
5. They are not framing risk accurately:  
 
85 SLO how to keep, Supra, note 40 
86 Mengel, Amy. Five Reasons Corporations are Failing at Social Media. Social Media Today.October 
12,2009. found at: http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/five-reasons-corporations-are-failing-
social-media 
 20 
The risk of social media is not abated by not participating. And, while there have 
certainly been some issues and miscues along the way, social media participation has yet 
to be the undoing of any company.87 
The previous five explanations highlight some of the internal issues that the proposed LNG 
industry will have to overcome when they implement their social media strategy. But “none of the 
examples required hyper-specialized knowledge or technology for a company to connect with 
people.”88 And,"[i]ndustry may be tempted to regard these characteristics of social media as risks, 
and indeed it is easy to take a wrong step. However, the difference between risk and opportunity 
is largely one of perception and strategy.”89  
Although, the LNG proponents may want to focus their social media strategy to 
specifically address the various BC stakeholders’ concerns it would be better if their strategy suits 
a general audience. A company should create an online existence that is open and not catering to 
just one group because it will leave many other groups out. “Stakeholders now increasingly 
expect corporations not only to communicate their corporate responsibility (CR) initiatives, but 
also to engage in on-line dialogue about environmental, social and governance issues.”90 This 
illustrates some of the issues that the LNG proponents should be able to discuss through their 
social media. Even if the online or social media exchange is not centered on the LNG proponents’ 
interests or products the communications are connecting their business with various stakeholders. 
“Being a constructive and contributing member of the social web not only builds social capital, 
but also allows a company to engage broad and diverse talent towards the achievement of shared 
goals.”91  
Moreover, the LNG industry proponents need to appreciate that they can utilize the 
various social media platforms to further their own goals.  
Social media tools make it possible like never before to collaborate with stakeholders 
throughout the value chain to identify challenges, innovate solutions and achieve 
sustainability goals. However, to step into this space requires not only the enabling 
technologies and networks, but a new organizational mindset as well – there needs to be a 
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culture of openness and collaboration that enables a company to look outside of itself for 
ideas.92  
Stakeholders can be a wealth of information as long as the LNG industry proponents take the 
necessary steps to encourage this interaction. This can mean that their internal corporate policies, 
procedures and processes may have to undergo a shift to include any relevant input from social 
media sources. Without the internal adaptations of their organization it can undermine the LNG 
proponents’ social media strategy detracting from their stakeholder engagement efforts. 
Likewise, there are many ways for companies to conduct stakeholder engagement and the 
use of social media to complement traditional engagement methods should make sense. However, 
 [c]ompanies that ignore this opportunity and do not engage in dialogue in social media 
are increasingly conspicuous in their absence. They are likely to experience declining 
levels of trust and respect from stakeholders, who are already complementing their own 
learning, networking and activity with social media tools.93 
As previously stated and reinforced by the above quote the LNG proponents need to understand 
that “the risk of social media is not abated by not participating.”94 And, once the decision is made 
to participate in social media there needs to be a genuine effort put-forth by the LNG proponents. 
The impacts of “technological and entrepreneurial innovation is creating an ever-changing menu 
of new communication channels. Facebook and Twitter are the most obvious ways the latest 
technologies have transformed corporate communications.”95 The LNG proponents’ social media 
strategy should be able to engage with the stakeholders on any of the platforms currently in use. 
And, the LNG proponents need to show they are listening to the stakeholders concerns by acting 
on the most relevant and consistent items being mentioned on social media. “[S]takeholder 
expectations increasingly shift away from company-controlled communication towards balanced, 
two-way dialogue in which stakeholders themselves have the opportunity to define both the scope 
of exchange and the terms by which it is conducted.”96 Having a social media strategy that 
 
92 Social Media/Extractive, Supra, note 84 
93 Social Media/Extractive, Supra, note 84 
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95 Kathuria, Seema. The Chief Communications Officer: Guiding Your Business in a Chaotic World found 
at: http://www.russellreynolds.com/content/chief-communications-officer 
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addresses these concerns will only assist the LNG proponents to engage stakeholders that want to 
interact through social media on-line.  
Moreover, the LNG proponents can look to social media to gain insight into the 
sociopolitical underpinnings of each BC community that they will have to engage as their projects 
traverse the province. It will be important for the LNG proponents to come up with an appropriate 
social media strategy that will incorporate both technological and entrepreneurial innovations that 
will help them to engage the various stakeholders. The on-line social media platforms will allow 
for the LNG proponents to have dialogue that is not limited to just corporate undertakings with 
various stakeholders, which builds social capital and relationships. With the majority of social 
media content being user-generated, the LNG proponents can gain valuable insight into the local 
opinions of stakeholders. Even though social media can provide a lot of benefits to the LNG 
proponents it should only be used to complement traditional engagement methods, which means 
the proponents still need to engage stakeholders one-on-one as illustrated in the next section. 
Kitimat LNG Project & the Haisla First Nation 
The Kitimat LNG project illustrates how the LNG industry should engage with the BC 
First Nations. The Kitimat LNG terminal97 and associated pipeline has two owners; Chevron 
Canada and Apache Canada are each 50% owners. And, Kitimat LNG has been developing the 
project with community and First Nations consultation with strict adherence to both Provincial 
and Federal government environmental review processes. “In 2005, Kitimat LNG and the Haisla 
Nation signed an Agreement in Principle (AIP)98 and entered a mutually supportive and 
precedent-setting partnership for the development of LNG facilities in the Haisla’s territory.”99 
The Haisla people are a BC First Nation located on the north coast of British Columbia 
and have been in that area since time immemorial. Various sites and areas within the Haisla 
 
97 Eyford Energy, Supra note 2 Appendix B found at: 
https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/www/pdf/publications/ForgPart-Online-e.pdf 
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http://a100.gov.bc.ca/appsdata/epic/documents/p244/1137189645610_5f08234ed4754316b54f925e3660
1e44.pdf 
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Nation’s traditional territory have been identified as potential locations for the proposed LNG 
facilities. The LNG proponents have actively engaged with the Haisla to advance specific project 
proposals, and the Haisla have been working towards community benefits associated with these 
projects.100 The Kitimat LNG project includes facilities for natural gas liquefaction, LNG storage, 
and marine loading adjacent to Douglas Channel near Kitimat, BC. 
Indeed, “[o]ne of the key aspects of the partnership was Kitimat LNG’s willingness to 
alter their original location of their facility to an area that the Haisla Nation have already 
developed as an industrial site.”101 By engaging with the Haisla Nation early in the process, 
Kitimat LNG has secured a partner in and advocate for the project, and established the company’s 
social license to operate in the Haisla’s territory.102 Likewise, through working effectively with 
Kitimat LNG, the Haisla Nation has emerged as a substantial beneficiary of LNG development in 
its territory. “The relationship includes a range of project-related benefits, such as economic 
growth, training opportunities, employment, other community and social benefits.”103 
 In sum, the aforementioned chapter reviews how proposed LNG proponents will have to 
pay specific attention to the socio-political climate in BC. Having government support for big 
energy companies to develop the natural gas resource in BC is only one part of the process to 
build the natural gas supply chain because the provincial government provides the regulatory 
licenses to allow resource extraction companies to operate. This section reviews how Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR)104 practices are the basis for the LNG industry proponents to engage 
with the public to gain their Social license to Operate in specific areas in BC. This segment then 
shows how social media tools can unite BC stakeholder groups with similar attitudes and shared 
beliefs. The LNG industry proponents will have to keep in mind that the advances in social media 
communications can also benefit their efforts if they can develop an effective social media 
strategy to engage the various stakeholders and/or rights holders found in this province. The 
section concludes with a review of the Haisla First Nation’s LNG agreement, which illustrates 
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adapt to meet their ever-changing business climate in which they operate so will the CSR definitions be 
modified to keep up with the innovative solutions developed by industry.   
 24 
how Kitimat LNG using early engagement practices has secured a partner with the Haisla Nation 
and established the company’s social license to operate in the Haisla’s territory. Developing 
effective engagement practices is important for the future LNG proponents and Chapter 2 will be 
reviewing the evolution of the legal landscape in BC to enhance the LNG proponents 
understanding.  
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Chapter 2.  
The Evolution of the Legal Landscape in BC  
This segment will provide a brief overview of the legal landscape with regards to First Nations in 
BC.105 The intent is to illustrate how Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution106 is only one 
component of modern Aboriginal case law and, will review the principles discussed by the Courts 
that enhance the understanding of the various doctrines that provide guidance to the Federal and 
Provincial Crowns on how they interact with First Nations. There will be a review of what the 
Federal and Provincial Crowns are required to do ensuring they have proper consultation and 
accommodation with BC First Nations. This will provide the LNG industry proponents with a 
superior understanding of what constitutes proper consultation and accommodation of BC First 
Nations’ interests in the land. There will also be a review of the agreements between First 
Nations, industry and BC which are economic partnerships based on pre-existing Aboriginal 
rights and title. This section will conclude with reviewing two examples of consultation: one 
following the right path and the other not so much. All of the aforementioned will benefit the 
proposed LNG industry’s understanding of the legal landscape with regards to First Nations in 
BC.  
Section 35 
It is important for the LNG industry to have an understanding of how Section 35 of the 
Canadian Constitution107 plays a role in the legal landscape of BC with regards to First Nations. 
Section 35 of the Constitution reads:  
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are 
hereby recognized and affirmed.  
(2) In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis 
peoples of Canada. 
 
105 This is not a paper confined to the legal analysis of Section 35 and Aboriginal case law; the intent is to 
provide a brief overview to illustrate some of the factors contributing to the socio-political climate in 
BC’s resource development initiatives. 
106  Constitution Act, 1982 found at: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/Const_index.html [hereinafter, 
“Section 35”] 
107 Ibid 
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(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” includes rights that now exist by 
way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired. 
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights 
referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.108 
 Evidently, the “Constitutional drafters purposively left the wording of s.35 vague as it 
was in the interest of the government to give these rights as small a scope as possible.”109 This 
results in First Nations relying on subsequent Aboriginal case law to bring clarity to Section 35. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed in several cases that Aboriginal rights exist in 
common law and the Court will continue to address other First Nations' issues as they arise. But, 
having one First Nation’s rights or title recognized does not mean that all First Nations in Canada 
will benefit from the Court’s decision. In any event the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions are 
about helping build positive relationships and furthering the goal of reconciliation between First 
Nations' rights holders and both the Federal and Provincial crowns. As stated by Chief Justice 
Lamer:  
Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all 
sides, reinforced by judgments of this Court, that we will achieve… a basic purpose of s. 
35(1) — “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the 
sovereignty of the Crown”. Let us face it, we are all here to stay. 110 
The notion of reconciliation is further reinforced by the court in the Mikisew111 where Justice 
Binnie states: 
“The fundamental objective of the modern law of aboriginal and treaty rights is the 
reconciliation of aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal peoples and their respective 
claims, interests and ambitions. The management of these relationships takes place in the 
shadow of a long history of grievances and misunderstanding. The multitude of smaller 
grievances created by the indifference of some government officials to aboriginal 
people’s concerns, and the lack of respect inherent in that indifference has been as 
destructive of the process of reconciliation as some of the larger and more explosive 
controversies.”112  
 
108 Section 35, Supra, note 106  
109 David C. Nahwegahbow and Nicole D.O. Richmond. “Impact of the 1982 Constitution on First Nations: 
Reflections on Section 35: Whether the Constitution Act has made a difference for First Nations?” 
National Journal of Constitutional Law 23. (2007/2008):153-171. Pg.165 
110 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter, “Delgamuukw”]. 
111 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] S.C.C. 69 [hereinafter, 
“Mikisew”] 
112 Ibid, at paragraph 1.  
 27 
The Court’s decisions also address the underlying values that the Federal and Provincial 
Crowns should be following as they interact with the First Nations in BC. The Court offers 
direction to the Federal and Provincial Crowns by referring to Constitutional doctrines like the 
Honour of the Crown and the Crown’s Fiduciary obligation with regards to its interaction with 
First Nations. The Courts refer to the doctrine of the Honour of the Crown and the Crown acting 
honourably in the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and is addressed by the 
court in Haida113 at paragraph 20:  
Where treaties remain to be concluded, the honour of the Crown requires negotiations 
leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims: R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at 
pp. 1105-6. Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed 
Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is 
always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises” (Badger, supra, at para. 
41).114  
The Fiduciary duty definition comes from two sources first is the dictionary definition and the 
second definition is how the courts have defined fiduciary. The lexical definition is as follows:  
Fiduciary duty is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this 
duty are called fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe a duty are called 
principals. Fiduciaries may not profit from their relationship with their principals unless 
they have the principals' express informed consent. They also have a duty to avoid any 
conflicts of interest between themselves and their principals.115 
The court in R. v. Sparrow states the following with regards to fiduciary:  
The Government has the responsibility to act in a fiduciary capacity with respect to 
aboriginal peoples.  The relationship between the Government and aboriginals is trust-like, 
rather than adversarial, and contemporary recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights 
must be defined in light of this historic relationship.116 
The Honour of the Crown and Fiduciary duty are two Constitutional doctrines that are continually 
referred to by the Courts when they are making their opinions known in modern Aboriginal case 
 
113 Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [hereinafter, “Haida”] 
114 Ibid, at paragraph 20  
115 Fiduciary duty definition: found at: https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty 
116 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter, “Sparrow”]. 
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law. The next section will review how reconciling Aboriginal rights and interests in the land with 
other interests has created the Crown’s duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate.  
Consultation & Accommodation  
A fundamental obligation of the Crown is to uphold their duties pursuant to Section 35 of 
the Constitution. As a result the BC Government has guidelines to assist when consulting with 
First Nations in BC premised on the fact that “government is legally required to consult with First 
Nations and seek to address their concerns before impacting claimed or proven aboriginal rights 
(including title) or treaty rights.”117 The Federal government also recognizes their obligations and 
in an attempt to guide officials by stating in the Federal Guidelines:  
The Crown’s efforts to consult and, where appropriate accommodate Aboriginal groups 
whose potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights may be adversely affected 
should be consistent with the overarching objectives of reconciliation. Reconciliation has 
two main objectives: 1) the reconciliation between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples 
and; 2) the reconciliation by the Crown of Aboriginal and other societal interests. 
Consultation and accommodation play a key role in the fulfillment of these two 
objectives.118  
Further, the reconciliation of pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty is addressed by the 
court in Haida119 at paragraph 20:  
This promise is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled through the process of 
honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that the Crown act honourably in 
defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them with other rights and interests. 
This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate.120  
 
117 Updated Procedures for meeting Legal Obligations when consulting with First Nations Interim dated 
May 2010 found at: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/DownloadAsset?assetId=9779EDACB673486883560B59BEBE782E&filena
me=legal_obligations_when_consulting_with_first_nations.pdf. [hereinafter, “BC Consultation Guide”] 
118Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the 
Duty to Consult. March 2011at page 6 of Part A: Overview. found at: pg.6 
119 Haida, Supra, note 113  
120 Haida, Supra, note 113 
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This in fact is a place the Province of British Columbia finds itself in needing to honourably 
negotiate land claims and truly reconcile the pre-existence of Aboriginal peoples who had their 
own way of governance and land holding system prior to the Crown asserting sovereignty.  
Significantly, in the most recent case dealing with the modern law of Aboriginal and 
treaty rights, the Supreme Court of Canada’s findings in Tsilhqot’in121 addresses and for the first 
time in Canada declares that Tsilhqot’in122 hold Aboriginal title to a tract of their ancestral land. 
The Court uses the principles established in Calder123, Guerin124, Sparrow125 and Delgamuukw126 
to determine the Tsilhqot’in have indeed established Aboriginal title to their ancestral lands.127 In 
Tsilhqot’in the Court cites Delgamuukw128 “including non-traditional purposes provided these 
uses can be reconciled with the communal and ongoing nature of the group’s attachment to the 
land.”129 And in Tsilhqot’in the Court states:  
In other words, Aboriginal title is a beneficial interest in the land: Guerin at p.382. In 
simple terms, the title holders have the rights to the benefits associated with the land – to 
use it and profit from its economic development. 130  
Moreover, in Tsilhqot’in the Court notes that that Aboriginal title comes with an 
“important restriction--it is collective title held not only for the present generation but for all 
succeeding generations.”131 This is worth consideration because during the consultation process 
with government over proposed developments there may not be enough deliberation given to the 
future generations’ use of the collective title land. In fact:  
Aboriginal groups consulted on individual projects have increasingly expressed concern 
over aggregate adverse cumulative effects of developments on their asserted or 
established section 35 rights. The courts have held that only new adverse impacts trigger 
a duty to consult but that the cumulative effects of past events must be considered as 
 
121 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 [hereinafter, “Tsilhqot’in”]. 
122 Ibid 
123 Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 [hereinafter, “Calder”]. 
124 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 [hereinafter, “Guerin”]. 
125 Sparrow, Supra, note 116   
126 Delgamuukw, Supra, note 110 at paragraph 110 
127 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121 at paragraph 6 
128 Delgamuukw Supra, note 110 at paragraph 110 
129 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121 at paragraph 67 
130 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121 at paragraph 70 
131 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121 at paragraph 74 
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“contextual evidence” to determine the seriousness of the potential impacts of the 
proposed development under consideration.132  
First Nations, governments and proponents who are involved with the consultation process should 
understand the restrictions on their current use of the land because the use and benefit of 
collective title lands includes future generations.  
Evidently, there is only one example of a British Columbia First Nation launching a 
lawsuit alleging its treaty rights have been violated by the adverse cumulative effects caused from 
decades of development. “The Blueberry River band’s lawsuit argues the cumulative effect of 
development in its traditional territory has harmed its way of life in violation of Treaty 8, which 
was ratified in 1900.”133 Their traditional territory is the location for many developments 
including: “two existing hydro dams in the region, there are roughly more than 16,000 oil and gas 
wells, 28,000 kilometres of pipelines, 4,000 square km of coal tenures, 5,000 square km of 
logging cut-blocks and 45,000 km of road.”134 The Blueberry River band’s location is where 
future LNG pipelines are planned and is also the future site of BC Hydro’s site C dam. In fact, 
their lawsuit “could affect B.C.'s planned Site C hydroelectric dam, as well as oil and gas 
development both inside and outside the band's territory.”135 Because this British Columbia First 
Nation is a member nation to Treaty 8, it triggers a high duty to consult and accommodate where 
appropriate. The provincial government should not erode or diminish treaty rights through 
excessive developments due to the fact that treaties fall under Section 35136 and are 
constitutionally protected.  
The Court in Tsilhqot’in137 reaffirms the duty to consult doctrine established in Haida138 
and the spectrum that the Court set out in its earlier ruling. In addition, the Court re-asserts their 
 
132 See Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650.  
133 Hume, Mark. First Nations seek injunction barring development in Fort St. John region The Globe and 
Mail (Vancouver)Wednesday, Mar. 04 2015 
134 Ibid 
135 Blueberry River First Nations lawsuit threatens Site C, fracking in B.C. Found at: 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/blueberry-river-first-nations-lawsuit-threatens-site-c-
fracking-in-b-c-1.2981820 
136 Section 35, Supra, note 106 
137 Tsilhqot’in, Supra, note 121 
138Haida, Supra, note 113   
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position with regards to how the duty to consult is a procedural duty that arises from the Honour 
of the Crown. The Court in Taku139 states: 
In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the Crown must act honourably, in accordance 
with its historical and future relationship with the Aboriginal peoples in question. The 
Crown’s honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full 
effect in order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s.35 (1).140 
This results in the provincial government having to undertake consultation with all First 
Nations regardless of established Aboriginal title.141 Although the province has policy guidelines 
with regards to consultation, these are a penurious implementation of the case law when the 
Crown delegates some of their consultation obligations to industry. As stated in the Provincial 
Guidelines:  
Proponents (any party, including industry, local governments, federal agencies and 
Crown Corporations, seeking decisions from the Province in support of activities related 
to land or resource development) are encouraged to engage First Nations as early as 
possible when seeking a decision. In some cases, the Province may delegate certain 
procedural aspects of consultation to proponents. Proponents are often in a better position 
compared to the Province, to exchange information about their decision requests and 
directly modify plans to mitigate any concerns.142  
The court suggests that industry should engage with First Nations as soon as possible and in some 
cases they can take on procedural aspects of consultation. If the LNG proponent is going to 
undertake any of the procedural aspects of consultation they should keep accurate records of their 
discussions with the First Nations. This way the LNG proponents will have a record of their 
consultation with the First Nations by documenting their discussions’ on issues raised and how 
the LNG proponent tried to address the issues. The duty to consult does not mean the parties have 
to reach an agreement. But, the outcome of early and ongoing engagement by the LNG 
proponents with First Nations can help them develop a strong working relationship built on 
respect.  
However, as indicated in Tsilhqot’in “[i]f the Crown fails to discharge its duty to consult, 
various remedies are available including injunctive relief, damages, or an order that consultation 
 
139 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550, 
2004 SCC 74 [hereinafter, “Taku”] at paragraph 24 
140 Ibid at paragraph 24 
141 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121 at paragraph 77 to 79 
142 BC Consultation Guide, Supra, note 117 
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or accommodation be carried out.”143 So, the Crown must be careful when relying on industry to 
carry out their fiduciary duty to consult, because the court might find that the procedural aspects 
delegated to industry within the consultation process are not adequate resulting in the duty to 
consult not being properly carried out by the Provincial Crown. This lack of certainty can 
jeopardize energy and resource development projects in British Columbia, which is a concern for 
any proponent wanting to do business in BC.  
Although, the consultation process is about making reconciliation agreements between 
the Crown and the First Nations’ rights holders it is also taking a toll on the First Nations. This is 
due to the fact of the large scope that developing an entire LNG supply chain entails. 
Given the pace and breadth of developments in Alberta and British Columbia, and the 
corresponding consultation demands placed on Aboriginal communities, many are facing 
“process fatigue”. They are also encountering challenges in terms of their capacity to 
participate in project assessments and reviews.144  
The challenges and “process fatigue” that First Nations are encountering involve both their 
personnel capacity and their financial capacity. For example, some First Nation communities in 
BC have small populations and in these communities you will have their members doing more 
than one of the community’s administrative tasks. As well the First Nations’ financial capacity 
can be impacted because in most cases each party is responsible for their own participation costs 
in the consultation process.  
In fact, government referrals can have a significant detrimental impact on a First Nation’s 
operating budget because they receive transfer payments or block funding from the government 
that is already earmarked for their existing services and programs. Meanwhile,  
[t]he courts have yet to rule on assigning costs for consultation. In limited circumstances, 
such as the environmental assessment process, the province will provide limited financial 
support directly to First Nations to help off-set consultation participation costs.145  
This is one example where the proponents can offer financial resources to support the First 
Nations with their participation in the consultation process in a meaningful way without having 
the courts intercede. This will minimize risk and potential downstream project delays for the 
LNG proponents because offering financial resources while still in the initial consultation stage 
 
143 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121  
144 Eyford Energy, Supra, note 2  
145 BC Consultation Guide, Supra, note 117 at page 3 
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will help the First Nation participate in project assessments during the proponent’s scheduled 
time. When the LNG proponent makes a financial offer to help with the First Nation’s 
participation in the consultation process they should be mindful of the First Nations Financial 
Transparency Act146. This will provide the LNG proponents guidelines to follow which they can 
rely on if their payments are ever questioned by other members of a First Nation or other 
organizations.     
It is evident that the BC Government has a multitude of legal obligations in order to meet 
its own regulations under policy and more importantly to ensure they uphold Section 35 of the 
Constitution. Given the fact that First Nations in British Columbia have not given up, ceded or 
surrendered their Aboriginal title or rights claims it is evident that First Nations will be seeking 
remedies both through the courts particularly post Tsilhqot’in147 and in the form of reconciliation 
agreements through consultation. Therefore, the Provincial Government should be following the 
five fundamental components of the duty to consult as developed by what are known as the 
“trilogy cases”; Haida, Taku and Mikisew which are:  
1. the duty to consult arises prior to proof of an Aboriginal rights or title claim or in the 
context of uncertain affects on a treaty right; 
2. the duty to consult is triggered relatively easily, based on a minimal level of knowledge 
on the part of the Crown concerning a possible claim which government action 
potentially interferes; 
3. the strength or scope of the duty to consult in particular circumstances lies along a 
spectrum of possibilities, with a richer consultation requirement arising from a 
stronger prima facie Aboriginal claim and/or a more serious impact on the 
underlying Aboriginal right or treaty right; 
4. within this spectrum, the duty ranges form a minimal notice requirement to a duty to 
carry out some degree of accommodation of the Aboriginal interests, but it does 
not include an Aboriginal veto power over any particular decision, and; 
 
146 First Nations Financial Transparency Act S.C. 2013, c.7 found at: laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/F-
11.66.pdf [hereinafter, “FNFTA”]  
147 Tsilhqot’in , Supra, note 121 
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5. failure to meet a duty to consult can lead to a range of remedies, from an injunction 
against particular government action altogether (or, in some instance, damages) 
but more commonly an order to carry out the consultation prior to proceeding.148 
Moreover, the issue of overlapping and shared territory by BC First Nations is a situation 
that can impact the duty to consult, but the Provincial Government should still follow the five 
fundamental components of the duty to consult. Currently, there are 18 overlapping and shared 
territory agreements between BC First Nations.149 When The LNG proponents are taking part in 
the consultation phase they should take the approach of being inclusive and transparent, as this 
will allow the LNG proponent to benefit from any existing agreements or protocols that the First 
Nations may already have in place with regards to their overlapping territory and shared territory. 
Also, the LNG proponents need to understand their role during the consultation stage with First 
Nations is to share information about their plans and to listen to the First Nations’ feedback. The 
LNG proponents are never in a position to determine which one of the First Nations’ claims is 
stronger than the others. This means the LNG proponents should engage with all First Nations 
that can be impacted by their projects because this is the best time for the LNG proponents to 
alter their plans to mitigate the First Nations’ concerns. 
Likewise, the First Nations’ concerns look at addressing the potential impacts of the 
proponents’ activities starting with general terms and then moving to specific terms. The 
environment is a general term which includes the region’s flora, fauna and water. The specific 
terms are linked to one First Nation and include their cultural sites, archaeology sites and specific 
areas within their traditional territory where hunting and gathering takes place. During the initial 
consultation stage is when the LNG proponents should ask if the First Nation has a Traditional 
Use (TU) study or Traditional Knowledge (TK) study in place for their reference. These studies 
will provide the LNG proponents with a great deal of insight and understanding for that specific 
First Nation. But, the LNG proponents should understand the costs and benefits associated with 
undertaking any one of these studies because if the First Nation has no TU/TK studies in place 
this has the potential to become a bargaining chip in their negotiations. The LNG proponents need 
 
148 Newman, Dwight G. “The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples”. 2009. Purich 
Publishing Ltd. Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. 
149 BC Treaty Commission 2014 Annual Report found at: 
http://www.bctreaty.net/files/pdf_documents/2014_Annual_Report.pdf   
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to also gain an understanding of how to secure First Nations’ consent through economic 
partnerships.  
Gaining Consent through Agreements  
The Court in Tsilhqot’in provides further guidance to both the Crown and Industry when 
it comes to pursuing economic development initiatives in British Columbia and suggests the 
optimal way forward is to secure First Nations’ consent when it comes to major resource 
development.150 Having BC First Nations’ consent is the ultimate objective to safeguarding 
reconciliation and more importantly to guaranteeing that resource development initiatives move 
forward with certainty in British Columbia (and Canada). Gaining BC First Nations’ consent 
around the doctrine of the duty to consult can be what drives the creation of Impact Benefit 
Agreements and, Economic Community Development Agreements which are economic 
partnerships based on pre-existing Aboriginal title and rights. The next section will review 
various economic partnerships currently available in BC for the LNG industry which secure First 
Nations’ consent. 
Moreover, Impact Benefit Agreements or IBAs are agreements between Industry and 
First Nations typically dealing with natural resource development. Each IBA has distinct 
parameters but they generally operate on two premises:  
First, is to accommodate aboriginal interests by ensuring that benefits and opportunities 
flow to the community. Second, is to address social risk factors within the community 
such as adverse socio-economic and biophysical effects of rapid resource 
development.”151  
IBAs are the formal contracts that outline the roles and responsibilities of the parties, which often 
include the following: revenue sharing; the scope and the length of each project; jobs skills and 
training opportunities within the Industry; and any other potential economic opportunities 
available to the First Nations partner. 
“From a corporate perspective, IBAs align with corporate interests and operate on a 
business model whereby proponents complete IBAs to minimize risk and potential 
 
150 Tsilhqot’in  Supra, note 121 at paragraph 90 to 92 
151 Fidler, Courtney and Michael Hitch. Impact and Benefit Agreements: A Contentious Issue for 
Environmental and Aboriginal Justice . Environments Journal Volume 35(2) 2007 found at: 
http://www.infomine.com/publications/docs/Fidler2007.pdf [hereinafter, ”IBA Contentious Issue”] 
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downstream project delays (i.e. costly litigation) and, in doing so, improve relationships 
with local residents and enhance their business reputation.”152  
Even though the above-mentioned appears to just benefit corporate interests one cannot overlook 
the fact that IBA agreements provide mutually beneficial certainty for all of the parties because 
they create benefits for the potential impacts to local First Nations, as well as allow the First 
Nations to participate in the project’s Environmental Review process.153 In the end, “the impetus 
for mineral exploration companies to seek aboriginal approval has come from an absence of 
government intervention--a political vacuum--rather than the imposition of laws and policies.”154  
Similarly, there are other specific agreements that are meant to set out formal 
relationships between First Nations, BC and industry where the goal is to have resource revenue 
sharing. In one type of agreement BC enters into Economic and Community Development 
Agreements or ECDA's with First Nations communities and they are for sharing the mineral tax 
revenue on new mines and major mine expansions. These agreements are meant to set out the 
formal relationship with the goal of long term successful economic initiatives for First Nations, 
BC and the Mining Industry.155 A further example of BC resource revenue sharing is the Forest 
and Consultation and Revenue Sharing Agreements or FCRSAs. These agreements "provide First 
Nations communities with economic benefits returning directly to their community based on 
harvest activities in their traditional territory."156 A different instance of a BC agreement is the 
Strategic Engagement Agreements or SEAs. These arrangements deal specifically with 
consultation and accommodation and set out mutually agreed upon terms for how the consultation 
and accommodation process will transpire. This is a great way for First Nations to incrementally 
build governance and is one way for First Nations to be a part of the overall decision making 
process.157 According to Minister Rustad: “[e]ight or nine years ago, the province had virtually no 
 
152 Ibid 
153 What are Impact Benefit Agreements: found at: http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/What-are-
Impact-and-Benefit-Agreements-%28IBAs%29/ 
154 IBA Contentious Issue, Supra, note 151 pg.57 
155 for more information and to see which First Nation communities in BC have ECDA's found a: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=00D9B39C169B4E95BAAB740A9B52D54A 
156 for more information and to see what BC First Nations have FCRSA's please see: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=5633DE296BAC46098E130A382AAF9D03 
157 for more information on SEA's or to see a list of First Nations who have SEA's please go to: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=00C8FEF3481D4028B1EF0FD67B1695C4  
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agreements with First Nations[…]. Today, we probably have--just on the resource side alone--
over 200 significant agreements and another 100 or 200 minor agreements.”158 The 
aforementioned demonstrates BC’s response to address Section 35159 jurisprudence through the 
various resource revenue sharing policies.  
Moreover, the future LNG companies in BC need to work on collaborative approaches to 
include the numerous First Nations in the development of the LNG industry. The most recent 
addition to BC’s agreements are the Natural Gas Pipeline Benefits Agreements or NGPBAs. 
These include:  
agreements between Government and First Nations that are part of the B.C. 
Government's comprehensive approach to partnering with First Nations on liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) opportunities, which also includes development skills training and 
environmental stewardship projects with First Nations.160  
These are recent additions to the slate of BC Agreements with First Nations.161 But, each one of 
the agreements meets a specific goal of the Provincial government’s approach to include First 
Nations in some aspect of resource development. This ensures the Provincial government is also 
meeting their fiduciary obligation to consult and where appropriate accommodate First Nations’ 
interests.  
Examples of Consultations: 
This next portion will briefly review two projects that have utilized significantly different 
paths to engaging or addressing First Nations’ interests with their project proposals. The first 
company called HEC B162 works on developing run of the river power projects also known as 
Independent Power Projects (IPPs) that, once operational, will sell the power they generate to BC 
 
158 Meissner, Dirk. Historic land claims ruling urges B.C. to forge closer ties with First Nations. The Globe 
and Mail. July 01 2014. Found at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/in-wake-of-
ruling-bc-forging-ties-with-first-nations-takes-on-urgency/article19408627/  
159 Section 35, Supra, note 106 
160 For more information on the Natural Gas Pipeline Benefit Agreements please go to: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=A81A6F172BE94B798B0F8C540ED26D04 
161 for more information and to view the comprehensive list of the First Nations who have signed the 
NGPBA's can be found at: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/topic.page?id=A81A6F172BE94B798B0F8C540ED26D04 
162 The company name is fictitious due to non-disclosure agreements however, the facts presented are 
accurate and the Vancouver Island Green Energy Limited Partnership (VIGELP) is also a false name.  
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Hydro. The second company is Taseko Mines Ltd., a mid-tier copper mining company trying to 
open its prosperity mine in BC. 
A Successful Consultation with an Independent Power Producer  
On the one hand, HEC B was very active and engaging to enable First Nation Indian 
Band A (FNIB A)163 to become involved in the Vancouver Green Energy limited Partnership 
(VIGELP). HEC B and FNIB A were able to reach an agreement to develop an IPP together. 
However, each party took the necessary time to getting to know each other; this was a reciprocal 
relationship building exercise; HEC B spent a lot of time getting to know the First Nation 
community and FNIB A spent a lot of time getting know HEC B. The process of relationship 
building and taking the necessary time is critical to a successful partnership. A majority of the 
time these parties spent together was on relationship building at the leadership level; so FNIB A 
Chiefs were able to get to know the HEC B CEO and Board, whereas only a small fraction of the 
time was spent on the actual negotiations. And, to be clear, there is no prescribed time limit on 
building lasting relationships. Parties will need to put in the time to build mutually respectful 
relationships because project negotiations will fall apart if a relationship has not been properly 
built and appropriately maintained.  
After their relationship had been effectively built it was during the negotiations when it 
was decided that HEC B would provide the following: FNIB A’s legal costs were covered by 
HEC B with regards to the negotiations of the VIGELP. FNIB A needed to come with 10% for 
their capital contribution and HEC B would give them a gift of 5%. This would mean that FNIB 
A would start out with 15% equity in VIGELP. However, FNIB A would need $423,500164 as 
their capital contribution to receive 635,250 units of VIGELP. Although the original cost per unit 
of VIGELP is 1$/unit the FNIB A receives their initial units at 0.67/unit.165 The other option 
negotiated was to take a straight royalty rather than buying into the 15% equity if FNIB A was 
unable to fund their capital contribution. At the end of the engagement and consultation process 
 
163 FNIB A has been placed in 3rd party management from time to time because of poor financial 
management on numerous occasions which may have impacted their capital contribution. 
164 A funding agency that a BC first Nation can turn to for funding arrangements is The First Nations 
Finance Authority which provides funds to eligible First Nations in Canada. Found at: 
http://www.fnfa.ca/en/ 
165 This is a savings of 0.33/unit for FNIB A right from the beginning. 
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HEC B and FNIB A came to an agreement. They successfully concluded an IBA and also a Joint 
Venture. FNIB A decided that the royalty, with a first right of refusal if the HEC B decides to 
ever sell all or part of the IPP, was a more viable option for their First Nation at that time.  
An Unsuccessful Consultation - Taseko Mines Ltd. 
Taseko Mines Ltd. is a mid-tier copper mining company trying to open its Prosperity 
mine in BC. However, Taseko's New Prosperity mine has been delayed because “[a]fter a second 
lengthy and costly federal review, the federal government has once again stood in the way of the 
development of an important project to B.C.”166 The planned gold and copper mine has once 
again failed to pass or meet the environmental concerns expressed by the federal government and 
others. In fact, the “New Prosperity project could not proceed after federal Environment Minister 
Leona Aglukkaq decided it would cause significant adverse environmental effects that could not 
be mitigated.”167 Rather than accept defeat Taseko has challenged those conclusions, and in 
December applied for a federal judicial review. It is evident that Taseko is more concerned with 
the regulatory frameworks than dealing with the local First Nations who are rights and title 
holders.  
The Tsilhqot’in Government following their recent Supreme Court of Canada case, which 
is the first case to declare title in Canada, has significantly expanded aboriginal land title rights 
and is further establishing ground rules for mining projects within its traditional territory. The 
Tsilhqot’in National Government’s mining policy also follows the group’s successful fight 
against the New Prosperity mine, proposed by Taseko Mines Ltd., which the federal government 
rejected earlier this year due to the potential impact on a lake considered sacred by surrounding 
First Nations.168 The Tsilhqot’in Nation said it is not opposed to mining on its territory, but 
resource companies need to respect the rights of aboriginals if they want their projects to proceed. 
“We had the example of Taseko Mines, who showed us what not to do. We need proponents and 
industry to begin showing a lot more respect for our people and our nation if they want to build 
 
166 Taseko president Russ Hallbauer said in an interview with Justine Hunter and Wendy Stuek. Taseko 
brushes off Ottawa’s rejection of B.C. gold-mine proposal. The Globe and Mail. February, 27, 2014 
167 Hunter, Justine and Wendy Stuek. Taseko brushes off Ottawa’s rejection of B.C. gold-mine proposal. 
The Globe and Mail. February, 27, 2014  
168 Keller, James. Tsilhqot’in Nation Establishes rules for mining in its Territory near Williams Lake, B.C.. 
Globe and Mail. July 31, 2014 
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partnerships in our territory.”169 It is clear that Tsilhqo’tin are not opposed to economic 
development nor are they opposed to creating lasting partnerships with industry. They are, 
however, opposed to embarking on a project that damages the environment and impacts the land 
in a way that it can no longer support the generations to come. There must be a balance of 
working with industry in creating jobs, wealth and that of being stewards of the land.  
Chapter 2 Summary  
In summation, the previous section provides a brief overview of the legal landscape with 
regards to First Nations in BC. The intent is to illustrate how Section 35170 of the Canadian 
Constitution171 is only one component of modern Aboriginal case law. Reconciliation of the First 
Nations’ interests in their traditional territories is one of the outstanding issues in BC. The case 
law shows that the Court supports reconciliation of Aboriginal interests’ in the land and develops 
constitutional doctrines such as Honour of the Crown and Fiduciary duty. These doctrines provide 
guidance to crown actors on how to address reconciliation and meet the procedural requirements 
to properly carry out consultation and accommodation. In fact, the “trilogy cases”; Haida, Taku 
and Mikisew provide the guidelines for when the Crown has a duty to consult First Nations.  This 
section also provides the LNG proponents with guidance on how they can best participate in the 
consultation and accommodation process. The reviews of the agreements between First Nations, 
industry and BC which are economic partnerships based on pre-existing Aboriginal rights and 
title provide contextual evidence of working agreements in BC. This section concludes by 
providing two examples of consultation: One approach tries to rely on just the regulatory 
approach and ignores any input from the First Nations or other community members. While the 
other one takes the time to follow the regulatory process and engage with the local First Nation 
community to gain their insight on the proposed IPP’s impact on their traditional territory. The 
two distinct outcomes speak to which approach is better suited for resource development in BC. 
Indeed, the previous chapter’s discussions benefit the LNG industry by increasing their 
understanding of the legal landscape with regards to First Nations in BC; specifically with how 
the LNG proponents can best participate in the consultation and accommodation process. The 
 
169 Chief Russell Myers-Ross of Yunesit’in found in the James Keller. Tsilhqot’in Nation Establishes rules 
for mining in its Territory near Williams Lake, B.C.. Globe and Mail. July 31, 2014  
170 Section 35, Supra, note 106  
171 Section 35, Supra, note 106 
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upcoming chapter will provide the LNG proponents with a review of the First Nations’ 
governance models that can be obtained in today’s socio-political climate. 
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Chapter 3.  
 
First Nations Governance Models  
This chapter will briefly review First Nations’ governance models that can be obtained in 
today’s political climate in BC and they are as follows172: 
a. Indian Act173 alone with no delegated jurisdictions  
b. Indian Act with FNLMA174 (Land Code) and/or Taxation [eg.s.83/ FNFMA175]  
c. Indian Act with Self Government176 [eg. Westbank, Sechelt models] 
d. Pre-Confederation Treaties in BC: [eg. Treaty 8177, Douglas Treaties178] 
e. Modern BC Treaty Negotiation Process179 [eg. Nisga’a180, Tsawwassen181and, Maa-
nulth182]  
Although, gaining independence through the various governance models is a positive move by the 
BC First Nations, this chapter will examine which models best foster economic development. My 
supposition is the more governance jurisdiction a First Nation has will increase their autonomy, 
improve their decision making, and increase their self-reliance which will have a positive impact 
on their economic development initiatives. Explicit is that good governance and jurisdictional 
powers enables a First Nation to not only build their community but also prepares a First Nation 
to engage in multi-stakeholder conversations that will advance their communities’ economic 
growth.  
 
172 The First Nations’ governance chart below is formatted to fit this document 
173 Indian Act, (R.S., 1985, c I-5) found at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/I-5/index.html [hereinafter, 
“Indian Act”] 
174 First Nations Land Management Act (S.C. 1999 c. 24) found at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-
11.8/ [hereinafter, “FNLMA”] 
175 First Nations Fiscal Management Act, (S.C. 2005 c. 9) found at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/F-
11.67/ [hereinafter, “FNFMA”] 
176 For analysis of the Indian Act with Self Government agreements see text accompanying notes 208,209  
177 For further analysis of Treaty 8 see text accompanying notes 221,222 
178 For further analysis of the Douglas Treaties see text accompanying notes 219,220 and 223 
179 For further analysis of the BC Treaty process see text accompanying notes 236,238 and 240  
180 For further analysis of the Nisga’a Treaty see text accompanying notes 225,227 and 230 
181 For further analysis of the Tsawwassen Treaty see text accompanying note 242 
182 For further analysis of the Maa-nulth Treaty see text accompanying notes 243,244 
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Another important consideration for the LNG industry proponents is that each First 
Nation in BC has a unique historical, cultural, geographical, political and economic situation 
which needs to be respected. Having an understanding of the various First Nations’ governance 
models will support the LNG proponents’ obligation of engaging with the various First Nations. 
After all, the LNG industry will not be able to pick and choose the First Nations that are ready 
willing and able to engage. The LNG proponents will have to be able to work collaboratively 
with every First Nation on their pipelines’ path and also work with any First Nations impacted by 
any of the LNG developments. Knowing the five possible First Nations’ governance models will 
help the LNG industry proponents achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. 
Background:  
A majority of British Columbia has not concluded land claims agreements leaving the 
province hindered by outstanding First Nations’ land claims. There are approximately 200183 First 
Nations communities in British Columbia most of whom have not given up, ceded or surrendered 
their Aboriginal title and rights claims to their traditional territory within British Columbia.184 
Section 35 of the Constitution is the catalyst for First Nations to revitalize their self-government 
process. Given the myriad of differences within First Nations communities in BC it is going to 
take some First Nations’ governance reform to work towards being able to implement their 
inherent rights under Section 35 Since First Nation communities are now in a position to be 
developing their own governance models, this section will examine the different approaches to 
First Nations governance that are currently available within the constitutional and legislative 
frameworks of Canada. The First Nations governance models currently available include: 
continuing with the Indian Act alone; Indian Act with First Nations Land Management185 and/or 
Taxation either under S. 83 of the Indian Act or the First Nations Fiscal Management Act186; 
Indian Act with Self-Government Agreements; pre-Confederation Treaties (Treaty 8 and Douglas 
Treaties) and negotiating a modern day treaty using the BC Treaty Process.  
 
183 About British Columbia First Nations found at: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100021009/1314809450456  
184 First Nations in BC See Appendix B for a map – prepared by AANDC  
185 FNLMA, Supra, note 174 
186 FNFMA, Supra, note 175 
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Frameworks Overview:  
The Constitution187 under Section 91(24)188 gives Federal parliament the power to make 
laws in relation to Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians. And, pursuant to Section 91(24) of 
the Constitution the Federal Government has the ability and the sole responsibility to make laws 
governing Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians. Thus, the Indian Act exists and gives sole 
responsibility to the Federal Government to oversee the lives of Status Indians189 or First Nations 
in Canada that live both on and off-reserve. However, there has been a slight change in the 
division of powers when it comes to laws of general application and inter-jurisdictional 
immunity. The Court in Tsilhqot’in held that:  
The doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is directed to ensuring that the two levels of 
government are able to operate without interference in their core areas of exclusive 
jurisdiction. This goal is not implicated in cases such as this. Aboriginal rights are a limit 
on both federal and provincial jurisdiction. The problem in cases such as this is not 
competing provincial and federal power, but rather tension between the right of the 
Aboriginal title holders to use their land as they choose and the province which seeks to 
regulate it, like all other land in the province. Interjurisdictional immunity — premised 
on a notion that regulatory environments can be divided into watertight jurisdictional 
compartments — is often at odds with modern reality. Increasingly, as our society 
becomes more complex, effective regulation requires cooperation between interlocking 
federal and provincial schemes. Interjurisdictional immunity may thwart such productive 
cooperation.190 
This is the Court’s way of ensuring that Aboriginal rights and title are protected while at the same 
time balancing the constitutional parameters of s. 92 of the Constitution and providing the 
necessary space to regulate the province.191 The notion of cooperative federalism is at the genesis 
of the Court’s guidance.192  
 
187 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 [hereinafter, the “Constitution 1867”] 
188 Section 91(24) contains two heads of power: (1) Indians and (2) Lands Reserved for Indians. 
[hereinafter, “S. 91(24)”] 
189 Section 2(1) of the Indian Act, R.S. 1985 C1-5 defines Status Indians. 
190 Tsilhqo’tin, Supra, note 121 at paragraph 141 
191 Tsilhqo’tin, Supra, note 121 
192 For more on cooperative federalism please see Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services 
Society, 2011 SCC 44 (PHS) 
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Indian Act alone with no delegated jurisdictions  
Since confederation, the Indian Act193 is the only form of governance a First Nation 
community has been able to exercise, which arguably is not an exercise of autonomy or self-
governance at all. The Indian Act is top-down paternalistic legislation that is not accountable to 
each respective First Nations’ citizen but rather is only accountable to the bureaucrats in Ottawa. 
Also, under the Indian Act model of governance there is no ability to implement a Nation’s own 
inherent governance because a First Nation can only perform what the Indian Act allows under 
statute. “In general, the Indian Act would appear to foster a punitive, restrictive, regulatory 
organizational culture.”194 This form of governance impedes economic development because of 
the rigorous process of seeking Ministerial approval for all progressive activity and improvement 
that occurs on Section 91(24) Reserve Lands195.  
 Indian Act with First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA) 
The FNLMA is a federal law and signing the Framework Agreement is the first step for a 
First Nation to assume control over its reserve lands, resources and the environment.196 “Enacted 
federally in 1999, the FNMLA provides an option for First Nations to replace the land 
management provisions of the Indian Act with community-level jurisdiction over allotment of 
property rights to Band members and leasing agreements with off-reserve parties.”197 FNLMA 
only applies to Reserve Lands, or lands held pursuant to Section 91(24) of the Indian Act, and it 
does not apply to fee simple lands or to treaty settlement lands. Essentially, FNLMA removes the 
Federal Government as an intermediary between: Entrepreneur, First Nation, and Investor, and 
through this process the community will eventually be implementing a land code that is drafted 
 
193 Indian Act, Supra, note173  
194 Abele, Frances. Like an Ill-Fitting Boot: Government, Governance and Management Systems in the 
Contemporary Indian Act. Research Paper for the National Centre for First Nations Governance. June 
2007.  
195 Reserve Land as identified in the Indian Act, reserve land is "a tract of land, the legal title to which is 
vested in Her Majesty, which has been set apart by Her Majesty for the use and benefit of a band". found 
at: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100034737/1100100034738 
196 Lands Advisory Board found at: http://www.labrc.com/framework-agreement/lands-advisory-board/ 
197 Baxter, Jamie and Micheal Trebilock. “Formalizing” Land Tenure in First Nations: Evaluating the Case 
for Reserve Tenure Reform. Indigenous Law Journal/Volume 7/Issue 2/2009 found at: 
https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/18355/1/ILJ7.2-BaxterandTrebilcock.pdf at pg. 83 
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by the community for the community.198 Under the community developed FNMLA Land Code, 
the Indian Act provisions relating to land management no longer apply to those First Nations who 
have ratified Land Codes. This means First Nations under the FNMLA will have the authority to 
create their own system for making Reserve Land allotments to individual First Nation 
members.199 Also, the FNLMA places the First Nation in the driver’s seat when looking at 
economic development on their Reserve Lands because they have worked to replace the land 
management provisions of the Indian Act. 
Having a Land Code is one method for first Nations to incrementally take on jurisdictions 
for their community and to start slowly rebuilding their nation state, by building upon the First 
Nations’ traditional governance and translating their traditions into contemporary laws. John 
Burrows asserts that:  
One should be careful not to equate change in indigenous cultures with the extinction of 
indigenous cultures. Something does not automatically become non-indigenous just 
because indigenous people adapt and adopt contemporary objects in their ideas and 
experiences.200  
Moreover, First Nations will also gain the authority to formalize policies that will address 
matrimonial real property interests or rights. The FNMLA states that First Nations are responsible 
for enacting rules and procedures to address the issues of property rights in the cases of a 
breakdown of a marriage. Currently, there is a legislative gap in addressing matrimonial property 
rights on reserve and this is because the Indian act is silent on this issue.201 And, First Nations 
under the FNMLA have 12 months from the date their Land Code takes effect to enact the rules 
and procedures dealing with matrimonial rights or interests on reserve land into their Land Code 
or a First Nation law.202 This is a significant feature of a Land Code because those First Nations 
who are under Indian Act and do not have matrimonial property laws will be subject to the federal 
 
198 Ibid 
199 First Nations Land Management Regime found at:  https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1327090675492/1327090738973 
200 Borrows, John. “Indigenous Legal Traditions in Canada” Report for the Law Commission of Canada 
(2006) found at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2008/lcc-cdc/JL2-66-2006E.pdf 
201 Grant John, Wendy. Report of the Ministerial Representative Matrimonial Real Property Issues on 
Reserves. March 9, 2007.  
202 First Nations Land Management Act and Matrimonial Interests and Rights. AANDC. found at: 
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1317228777116/1317228814521 
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matrimonial property laws.203 This just further illustrates and exemplifies the lack of First Nation 
independence when being governed by just the Indian Act alone.  
Evidently, the FNLMA provides the community with a sense that managing their own 
land is a significant step towards self-governing. But more importantly, First Nations are also 
experiencing improved economic development circumstances because they are able to attract 
business onto their reserve. Some of the factors that are influencing the new economic 
environment on the reserve are: certainty of local land laws being statutorily in place; control 
being exercised locally which provides direct access to First Nations representatives; and, 
decisions are not being delayed by having the Federal government bureaucracy involved.204 The 
First Nation’s Land Code and the supporting instruments provide third parties with a clear 
understanding of the conditions that currently exist on that reserve, which creates a climate of 
certainty for business investment. Probably the most important factor contributing to business 
activity on reserve lands are the efficiencies gained in relation to land management processes 
such as improved processing conditions. It is evident that in business, no one is happy when a 
project is sitting idle pending a decision. The FNLMA shortens the time it takes for an application 
to be processed and for decisions to be made, which undoubtedly provides a benefit to both the 
First Nations and businesses alike. 
Another sectoral arrangement available to First Nations in order to manage certain 
governance authorities is a taxation arrangement,205 which permits a First Nation to develop 
revenues through taxation. Taxation can be developed using Section 83 of the Indian Act or using 
First Nations Financial Management Act (FNFMA) to achieve taxation jurisdiction for a First 
Nation community. This is one incremental mechanism available to First Nations to become self-
governing because taxation enhances a First Nations government’s ability to deliver Nation 
specific services and programs to their citizens. Even when the First Nation is assuming taxation 
authorities and FNFMA land decision-making this does not fully eradicate the Indian Act from 
 
203 Family Homes on Reserves and Matrimonial Interests or Rights Act (Act). June 19, 2013. found at: 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/F-1.2.pdf 
204 Supra, note 189 
205 Section 83 of the Indian Act gives the First Nation authority to draw down jurisdiction same as the 
FNFMA. For comprehensive information on taxation powers please visit the First Nations Tax 
Commission at http://www.fntc.ca/ 
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First Nations governance, because these aforementioned decision-making jurisdictions only apply 
to Indian reserve lands and do not extend to any part of the First Nations’ traditional territory. 
Indian Act with Self Government [eg. Westbank, Sechelt models] 
As a matter of law the Federal government is responsible for the First Nations in Canada 
and ultimately the First Nations in British Columbia. “And, pursuant to Section 91(24) of the 
Constitution the Federal Government has the ability and the sole responsibility to make laws 
governing Indians and Lands. This means that First Nations will be working on a bilateral 
agreement”206 to negotiate self-government agreements with the Federal government under the 
Indian Act. The Federal government will always have a unique fiduciary relationship rooted in 
history with the First Nations’ people of Canada.207  
However, this relationship must evolve since First Nations also have an inherent right to 
be self-governing and to be self-sustaining. And, one mechanism, to enable the evolution of this 
relationship is through self-government arrangements with Canada.208 To enter into self-
government agreements the First Nations must follow the Federal government’s process for 
completing self-government agreements and follow these six steps: Submission of Proposal; 
Acceptance; Framework Agreement, Agreement in Principle; Final Agreement and Ratification; 
and, Implementation.209 Evidently, the Federal government acknowledges that self-government 
arrangements need to be able to take many forms to meet the needs of the diverse historical, 
cultural, political and economic circumstances of the Aboriginal communities involved. The 
Federal government has a process in order to meet the needs of any First Nation that wants a self-
government agreement because the Federal government is waiting for “submission of 
proposal”210 for self-government agreements from First Nations communities. The First Nation’s 
 
206 BCAFN Tool kit found at: http://www.bcafn.ca/toolkit/ 
207 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 and A Royal Proclamation October 7, 1763 found at: 
http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/proc63.htm 
208 Self Government Agreements can be found at: http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032275/1100100032276 
209 Self Government Process can be found at: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032275/1100100032276 
210 Ibid  
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proposal should outline their community’s needs and reflect what they want in their final 
agreement for their community’s ratification.  
For First Nations’ self-government agreements to be effective, they need to address, 
among other things, the structure of the new government and its relationship with other 
governments, new fiscal arrangements, the relationship of laws between jurisdictions, program 
and service delivery, and the self-government agreement’s implementation plan. The 
implementation of First Nations’ self-government agreements “should enhance the participation 
of Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian federation, and ensure that Aboriginal peoples and their 
governments do not exist in isolation, separate and apart from the rest of Canadian society.”211 
Good government in Aboriginal communities through modern treaties and self-government 
agreements helps to increase investor confidence, supports economic partnerships and provides 
benefits for all of the First Nation’s membership.  
In order to move forward and become economically successful First Nations in British 
Columbia should be looking at implementing their inherent right to self-government or at least 
taking significant steps towards self-government. An important feature of their governance model 
is to have a cultural fit. This means that their governance model will reflect the customs and 
traditions of their community, and “rebuild our Nations through the exercise of our right to self-
determination through strong, stable and culturally relevant systems of government”212 
Developing and having a constitution in place that the First Nation community understands and 
believes in can be an essential component of a successful governance model. A constitution 
provides a strong footing for other governance frameworks to be developed. Constitutions are the 
highest governing foundation for a First Nation community and are a direct reflection of their 
cultural values, traditions and governance system.  
Besides the cultural fit of a governance model, a governance model should consider five 
components at the centre of good governance. These are “the people, the land, laws and 
 
211 National Centre for First Nations Governance. Governance Best Practices Report. Submitted to the New 
Relationship Trust. June 2009, found at: 
http://fngovernance.org/publication_docs/NCFNG_Best_Practice_Report.pdf at page iii.  
212 Ibid  
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jurisdiction, institutions and resources.”213 Obviously, the community will have to determine 
which items from the list are the highest priority, but people seem to be important when they are 
the subjects of the rules of government. And, in the case of dealing with people, transparency is 
an important principle as this will give the community faith and understanding in their governing 
process as a whole.  
During the final stage of implementation of the self-government agreement for the First 
Nation it should be clear that self-government arrangements do not need to be implemented 
exclusively through treaties. There are other mechanisms that will play a role in the 
implementation process. One example is the Memoranda of Understanding, which are not legally 
enforceable but could be used to set out the political commitments needed for self-government 
arrangements. For some aspects of the agreement legally enforceable contracts can be used for 
setting out detailed, technical or time-limited agreements respecting the implementation of self-
government arrangements. Finally, legislation can be used in the following ways: to ratify and 
give effect to self-government agreements, to implement particular provisions of a self-
government agreement; and to act as a stand-alone mechanism when the parties concerned wish 
to implement First Nation’s self-government arrangements, but they do not apply to treaty related 
self-government arrangements. Once the bilateral negotiations are complete and an agreement is 
reached the final phase is self-government legislation. To date there are three First Nations that 
have negotiated agreements: Yukon First Nations Self-Government Act214, the Westbank Self-
Government Agreement215 and the Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act.216  
The Westbank First Nation located near Kelowna in central British Columbia has seen 
many economic benefits with their Self-Government Agreement. The Westbank First Nation’s 
Self-Government Act received Royal Assent in Ottawa and became law on May 6, 2004. “As of 
2011, WFN had contributed $80 million annual fiscal revenue to Canada and B.C. through the 
generation of sales tax, personal income tax, and corporate tax on Westbank First Nation lands; 
 
213 Supra, note 201 at page vii 
214 Yukon Self Government Act, (S.C. 1994, c. 35)  
215 An Act to give effect to the Westbank First Nation Self Government Agreement 
(S.C. 2004, c. 17) found at: http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/W-6.2/page-1.html 
216 Sechelt Indian Band Self-Government Act (S.C. 1986, c. 27) found at: http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/S-6.6/FullText.html.  
 51 
and $500 million annually to the local economy.”217 This illustrates how a Self-Government 
Agreement can benefit both the First Nation and the local community’s economy. And, this 
further proves that when a First Nation has good governance in place, has been given autonomy 
via their self- government agreement, “the whole region prospers.”218  
Pre-Confederation & Historic Treaties in BC: [eg. Treaty 8, Douglas 
Treaties] 
There is an example of one type of pre-Confederation Treaty219 in BC and that is the 
Douglas Treaties.220 There is also only one Historic or post-Confederation treaty221 in BC and that 
is Treaty 8.222 “The Douglas Treaties, were completed in the 1850s, covered parts of Vancouver 
Island and in 1899, Treaty 8 was extended to include part of northeastern British Columbia.”223 
These treaties put the government on notice that their duty to consult is on the high spectrum if 
there is going to be infringement on their existing Aboriginal treaty rights.224 Unlike modern 
treaties when a First Nation has negotiated a pre-Confederation Treaty and a Historic Treaty, the 
Indian Act is the governing legislation for the Indian Band or First Nation. And, under the Indian 
Act model of governance there is no ability to implement a Nation’s own inherent governance 
because a First Nation can only perform what the Indian Act allows under statute. This means that 
the Douglas Treaty First Nations and Treaty 8 First Nations would benefit from the previous 
discussions on: FNLMA and/or Taxation (eg. S.83/ FNFMA); and even developing Self-
 
217 West Bank First Nation Press Release. "Economic & Fiscal Benefits of WFN," Fiscal Realities 
Economists, Kamloops, November 2011 found at: http://www.wfn.ca/newsreleases.htm 
218 Pierre, Sophie. BC Treaty Commission Press Release. “Treaty Commission sees a Lack of Urgency in 
negotiations”. Found at: http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/treaty-commission-sees-lack-of-
urgency-in-negotiations-1572231.htm 
219 Douglas Treaty Map please see http://www.hulquminum.bc.ca/pubs/Douglas_treaties_map.pdf 
220 Douglas Treaties text can be found at: http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100029052/1100100029053 and for more information on Pre-Confederation 
Treaties and Historic treaties please see Madill, Dennis. British Columbia Indian Treaties in Historical 
Perspective, Research Branch Corporate Policy for the Department of Indian Affairs. 1981 found at: 
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/treC-
B_1100100028953_eng.pdf 
221 Treaty 8 Map please see NWT Aboriginal Relations & Intergovernmental Affairs found at: 
http://www.daair.gov.nt.ca/_live/pages/wpPages/Maps.aspx 
222 Treaty 8 can be found at: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100028805/1100100028807 
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Government Agreements as mechanisms to reconcile these historic and pre-confederation treaties 
with contemporary realities.  
Modern BC Treaty Negotiation Process: 
The Nisga’a Treaty  
“May 11, 2000, the Effective Date of the treaty, was a historic and triumphant day for the 
Nisga'a people. It marked the end of a 113-year journey-and the first steps in a new direction.”225 
The Nisga’a Treaty is the first modern treaty in British Columbia and the negotiations started 
prior to the existence of the BC Treaty Process.226 The completion of the negotiation process and 
the ratification of the treaty by each respective government (First Nations ratify by way of a 
community process, BC and Canada go through a parliamentary process ratifying the treaty) 
brought about resolution of the long standing Nisga’a land claim, catapulting the Nisga’a to 
independence through a constitutionally protected treaty, which is227 undoubtedly, the highest 
form of reconciliation in Canada.  
However, there was a lot of criticism from First Nations and British Columbians alike 
and there was even a legal challenge by Gordon Campbell228 regarding the Nisga’a Final 
Agreement. Some of the criticisms regarding their Treaty were related to setting the benchmark 
for other BC First Nations because: they received only a small portion of their traditional 
territory; they were expected to fail and be broke within a few years because they couldn’t 
possibly have the governance structures in place to properly govern; and they were sell outs. But 
few critics took into consideration the fact that the Nisga’a wanted control and jurisdiction of 
their land and their lives; the treaty is something their early leadership sought since 1890229 And, 
 
225 Understanding Treaty, Nisga’a Nation found at: http://www.nisgaanation.ca/understanding-treaty 
226 Negotiations started in 1973 through a bilateral Comprehensive Claims Process with Canada only and 
BC joining the negotiations in 1990 found at: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031298/1100100031299 
227 Benefits of Nisga’a Treaty found at: http://www.nisgaanation.ca/about-accomplishments-and-benefits-
nisgaa-treaty 
228 Campbell v. Nisga’a 2000 BCSC 1123 is found at: http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/jdb-txt/sc/00/11/s00-
1123.htm  
229 Supra, note 217  
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quite the contrary has occurred silencing the critics; for instance, the Nisga’a Lisims government 
has been involved in enhancing their programs and services to Nisga’a citizens; the Nisga’a have 
increased internet connectivity in the region through industry partnerships; as well as pursuing 
other economic opportunities to enhance the lives of Nisga’a culture and overall well-being.230  
Nisga’a includes several chapters outlining their governmental responsibilities.231 One 
value that is of significance to the Nisga’a Lisims government is environmental stewardship and 
management. Because “[u]nder no circumstances will the Nation accept a trade-off between 
environmental protection and economic benefits.”232 Also, stated by the Nisga’a Lisims 
government is:  
The Nass Area covers almost 27,000 square kilometers. About 8% of this area is Nisga’a 
Lands which roughly correspond to what people think of as the Nass Valley from Nass 
Camp to the coast. The Nation owns and has control over development on Nisga’a Lands. 
The Nation also has comprehensive rights relating to consultation and environmental 
assessment over proposed developments in the rest of the Nass Area.233  
Thus, when the crown and industry are pursuing economic development initiatives on 
Nisga’a Treaty Settlement Land or where Nisga’a have jurisdiction pursuant to their treaty there 
is a high duty to consult and accommodate the Nisga’a. This is because their treaty is 
constitutionally protected and as confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada there would be a 
high level and deep consultation would be required as per Haida234 when dealing with the 
instances of a treaty, consent for development is required. That is why in recent news the Nisga’a 
Lisims Government is entering into several agreements with regards to LNG. As stated in a news 
article:  
The Nisga’a Nation will receive approximately $6 million from the Province at various 
stages in the project: $1 million upon signing the agreement, $2.5 million when pipeline 
construction begins, and $2.5 million when gas starts to flow. 
The Nisga’a Nation will also receive a yet-to-be-determined share of $10 million a year 
in ongoing benefits that will be available to First Nations along the PRGT pipeline. The 
 
230 Benefits of Nisga’a Treaty found at: http://www.nisgaanation.ca/about-accomplishments-and-benefits-
nisgaa-treaty  
231 For more information regarding the treaty please see: http://www.nnkn.ca/files/u28/nis-eng.pdf 
232 Naas area strategy found at: http://www.nisgaalisims.ca/nass-area-strategy 
233 Ibid  
234 Haida, Supra, note 113 
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Province expects to be signing similar agreements with other First Nations along 
proposed natural gas pipeline routes in the near future.235  
Clearly, the Nisga’a Lisims Government are able to benefit from their treaty which supports the 
notion that negotiated treaties will help create a strong economic base for First Nations 
communities and their neighbors as well as provide the certainty BC needs for the ongoing 
resource developments.  
BC Treaty Process  
Although, the Indian Act still plays a significant role in the day-to-day lives of the First 
Nations’ people negotiating a modern day treaty can be one way to break free from under the 
Indian Act. The made in BC Treaty Process236 was established in 1992 to help resolve the 
numerous outstanding land claims in British Columbia.237 The BC Treaty Process is a tripartite 
process, meaning the Federal Government, Provincial Government and First Nations are 
negotiating a modern day land claim under their framework agreement.238 This unique process is 
meant to speed up the comprehensive land claims process and deal with the unresolved First 
Nations’ land claims in BC by negotiating a modern treaty.  
Since this process is voluntary and political it means not all First Nations in BC 
participate.239 According to the BC Treaty Commission “there are 65 Nations, representing 105 
Indian Act Bands out of a total of 199 Indian Act Bands in BC, which are participating in or have 
 
235 Nisga’a sign LNG Deal found at: http://www.lngworldnews.com/bc-nisgaa-nation-sign-lng-benefit-
agreement/ Additional text that is important from the news release is as follows: “The two governments 
are creating a strong framework for Nisga’a participation in the LNG sector and to ensure B.C. is in a 
strong position to compete in the new global market place. The Nisga’a and B.C. governments have both 
introduced legislation to enable the Nisga’a Lisims Government to levy and collect property tax from 
non-Nisga’a citizens and companies with industrial installations, such as LNG pipelines on Nisga’a 
Lands. The Ministry of Environment has also introduced the Protected Areas of British Columbia 
Amendment Act. The act would remove 63.5 hectares from Nisga’a Memorial Lava Bed Park for PRGT 
development and take effect once all regulatory approvals are received and the Nisga’a Final Agreement 
is amended. The route selected avoids specific cultural sites and has the support of the Nisga’a Lisims 
Government.” 
236 For a map of Treaty Negotiations in British Columbia please see Appendix C  
237 BC Claims Task Force Report can be found at: 
http://www.bctreaty.net/files/pdf_documents/bc_claims_task_force_report.pdf 
238 BC Treaty Commission process found at www.bctreaty.ca 
239 Ibid 
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completed treaties through the BC Treaty negotiation process.”240 There are six stages to the 
treaty process and these are: filing a statement of intent to negotiate; readiness to negotiate; 
negotiation of a framework agreement; agreement in principle; negotiating a final agreement; 
and, implementation of the treaty.241 To date there have been two agreements concluded under the 
BCTC Process: Tsawwassen242 and Maa-nulth243. Tsawwassen is the first urban treaty, whereas, 
Maa-nulth is the first multi-community treaty244 with its member nations spanning the west coast 
of Vancouver Island.245  
Once a treaty concludes under the BCTC’s process it will then be protected under Section 
35 of the Constitution. An example is the “The Tsawwassen Government will operate under the 
Tsawwassen Constitution and will enact laws over several fundamental matters.”246 The 
Tsawsassen Nation is now in control by determining their path forward and implementing their 
treaty provisions to match their vision driven by their community members. The Tsawwassen 
Nation is in a great urban location for economic development and the media has highlighted the 
nation's economic development with their building of a large scale mall. And, of course there are 
future plans for further economic activity at the Delta Port.  
By the way, a "2009 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers, concluded that completing 
treaties with First Nations will deliver more than $10 billion in benefits to British Columbia's 
economy over the next 15 years."247 For those First Nations who have modern treaties, they are 
 
240 BC Treaty documents found at: http://www.bctreaty.net/documents/FINALNewsRelease-
TrueInvestmentinTreatyNegotiationscopy.pdf 
241 Supra, note 228 
242 Tsawwassen Final Agreement found at: http://www.tsawwassenfirstnation.com/pdfs/TFN-
About/Treaty/1_Tsawwassen_First_Nation_Final_Agreement.PDF 
243 Maa-nulth Final Agreement found at: 
http://www.bctreaty.net/nations/agreements/Maanulth_final_intial_Dec06.pdf 
244 The five Maa-nulth member nations include: Ucluelet, Huu-ay-aht, Toquaht, Uchucklesaht, and, 
Ka:yu:kth/Che:k’tles7et’h. 
245Treaties will provide First Nations in BC with the economic and social tools to promote self-reliant 
communities, and provide them with the capacity to identify and implement their own solutions to 
difficult economic and social problems. As well, the province's overall economic and social well-being 
will benefit from strong, self-reliant First Nation communities. 
246 Centre for First Nations Governance: Tsawwassen First Nation. Principle: Expansion of Jurisdiction. 
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able to take control of their own futures by having their policies; their laws; and ultimately their 
governance reflect what is important to their members.248 It is also worthy to note that: 
Treaty Making is supported by industry, which sees modern treaties as the best and 
preferred way to establish a legal framework to clarify the attributes and geographical 
extent of Aboriginal rights, thereby contributing to a more stable, competitive, and 
predictable environment for economic and resource development.249  
The above-mentioned supports the notion that negotiated treaties will provide the certainty BC 
needs for satisfying industry and will help create an economic base for the First Nations’ 
communities.  
Additionally, the recent Maa-nulth treaty on Vancouver Island is the underlying factor 
leading to an agreement with Steelhead LNG. “A self-governing aboriginal group on Vancouver 
Island has signed a deal with a fledgling liquefied natural gas company in hopes of developing a 
massive project to export LNG to Asia.” Although, Vancouver Island is far from the natural gas 
fields in northeastern BC, “[t]here are now two terminals proposed for Vancouver Island – the 
other is the Discovery LNG project slated for Campbell River”. This demonstrates the potential 
wealth and prosperity that the proposed LNG industry in BC can provide. The Steelhead LNG 
chief executive officer Nigel Kuzemko…said “[w]e certainly see some clarity because of the 
signed treaty and the ability to be on treaty lands. We’re tremendously excited to do this working 
partnership at such an early stage of the project.” Early could be an understatement because most 
of the BC LNG supply chain is still in the planning and development phase as well as “[n]ew 
pipelines would need to be built for transporting natural gas across the Georgia Strait to 
Vancouver Island”.   
As briefly explored, the Indian Act is an overly bureaucratic and outdated policy dictated 
by those in Ottawa. Unless the Nation has been able to get out from the Indian Act, then the 
Indian Act continues to have an impact on the day-to-day lives of First Nation communities and 
 
248 Treaties will provide First Nations in BC with the economic and social tools to promote self-reliant 
communities, and with the capacity to identify and implement their own solutions to difficult economic 
and social problems. As well, the province's overall economic and social well-being will also benefit 
from strong, self-reliant First Nation communities. 
249 Eyford, Douglas. A New Direction: Advancing Aboriginal and Treaty Rights. A Report to the Minister 
of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. February 20, 2015. At page 37. [hereinafter, 
“Eyford Comprehensive Claims”] found at: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-
LDC/STAGING/texte-text/eyford_newDirection-report_april2015_1427810490332_eng.pdf 
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its members. It is up to a First Nation to determine which path of governance meets their 
community’s unique needs and pursue jurisdiction accordingly. Because, 
[s]uccessful economies stand on the shoulders of legitimate, culturally grounded 
institutions of self-government. Indigenous societies are diverse; each nation must equip 
itself with a governing structure, economic system, policies, and procedures that fit its 
own contemporary culture.250 
Once this has been attained then a First Nation community can continue to build its nation and 
move forward on their chosen path.  
However, each community needs to determine what path is right for them and when the 
timing is right for them to precede down their chosen path. Sometimes, it is internal factors 
influencing the community’s choice to take control over their reserve lands through implementing 
a land code; sometimes economic development initiatives will be the catalyst in determining the 
First Nation’s choice to enter into self-government arrangements; and sometimes litigation will be 
catalyst for First Nations entering into the modern day treaty process. Whatever the reason, First 
Nation communities require support and this support is going to be the legislative frameworks for 
governance and jurisdiction, financial ability and having the human capacity to implement.  
This chapter reviews some of legislative frameworks for governance and jurisdiction 
available to BC First Nation communities in order to move their First Nation in the direction their 
community sees fit. The governance models available to First Nations in BC provide varying 
levels of independence and economic improvements for the community. The governance model 
that provide the lowest level of independence and economic improvements is continuing with the 
Indian Act alone which does nothing to improve the lives of First Nations because under the 
Indian Act model of governance a First Nation can only perform what the Indian Act allows under 
statute. But, following the Indian Act with First Nations Land Management (FNLMA) places the 
First Nation in the driver’s seat when looking at economic development on their Reserve Lands. 
This gives a First Nation some independence and economic improvements for their community 
members living on reserve. Also, Following the Indian Act with taxation by using Section 83 of 
the Indian Act or using First Nations Financial Management Act (FNFMA) to achieve taxation 
 
250 Eyford Energy, Supra, note 2 at page 28 
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jurisdiction for a First Nation community is one incremental mechanism currently available and 
moves the First Nation towards becoming self-governing.  
On the other hand, the two governance models available to First Nations in BC that 
provide the best levels of independence and economic improvements are self-government 
agreements and modern treaties. These in turn build the First Nations’ governance and 
jurisdictional powers enabling a First Nation to build their community’s independence and 
prepare a First Nation to engage in multi-stakeholder conversations that will advance their 
communities’ economic growth. Having investor confidence is essential when the LNG 
proponents are engaging First Nations in BC with pipeline deliberations or any of the LNG 
supply chain consultations. The more autonomy a First Nation in BC has, the healthier their 
socio-political climates are for engaging any one of the future LNG proponents that may be 
coming to their traditional territory. And autonomy only increases a First Nations’ self-
determination, improves their decision making, and increases their resourcefulness which will 
have a positive impact on their economic development initiatives partnering with the LNG 
proponents.  
Unfortunately, even First Nations with healthy socio-political climates for engaging any 
of the future LNG proponents may run into issues where the engagement processes do not lead to 
mutually beneficial outcomes. The LNG proponents’ desired results and First Nations’ interests 
can lead to opposing perspectives that the engagement processes were never designed to address. 
The next chapter will review the consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues with a 
process that can address the differences between the parties.  
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Chapter 4.  
 
The Consensus Approach: Process & Strategy  
This section will focus on the consensus approach as a means to reconciling the LNG 
proponents’ energy interests with other third parties’ interests and BC First Nations’ interests. 
Generally speaking “[t]he relationships between the extractive industries and host communities 
have unique challenges and opportunities: Exploration is a high risk and competitive endeavor, 
which makes the timing of community engagement and co-planning a challenge”251 The 
consultation process is about building trust through a systematic engagement and proactive 
integration of feedback from the various stakeholders impacted by the proponent’s activities. The 
engagement processes may very well be creating company challenges in the following ways: 
The time required to help communities and others understand and reflect upon how they 
may be affected by the proposed project can challenge company timeframes. For the 
company, the high upfront costs of extractive operations impose tremendous financial 
pressure for speed, especially until the operation begins to return profits. Community 
interests, on the other hand, are in favor of taking the requisite time to reflect, to build 
trust and to make careful choices. Once construction begins, however, there is little 
flexibility.252 
The aforesaid clearly illustrates how industry proponents believe time is of the essence or speed is 
necessary, whereas, the community’s approach is centered on reflecting, building trust and 
making a careful choice regardless of any time constraints.  
These divergent viewpoints can create irreconcilable differences between the parties 
resulting in a situation where continuing to participate in the standard consultation process is no 
longer an option. But the LNG proponents can find themselves to be in a position where they 
cannot abandon a project because it is an integral portion of a LNG pipeline which means they 
need a process to resolve the conflict. The need for the LNG proponents continuing to pursue a 
specific course of action can result in using the consensus approach to resolving multi-
stakeholder issues. This section will begin by reviewing some of the parties that can take part in 
the consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues which include: the provincial 
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government, First Nations and Industry. The next steps will review the “when”, the “how” and 
the “why” to use the consensus approach to resolve complex issues with many stakeholders or 
rights’ holders involved with BC’s LNG resource developments. 
The Who:  
 This section will begin with a review of some of the parties that will be involved in the 
consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues which will focus on: the BC 
Government, the BC First Nations and the LNG industry proponents. And part of the consensus 
approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues is to be inclusive and give all potential impacted 
parties a voice. Which means the consensus approach can sometimes include any of the 
following: municipal governments, sporting associations, land owners, business owners and any 
other individuals or organizations being impacted by the LNG development in a specific area. But 
this segment focuses its review on the BC Government, the BC First Nations and the LNG 
industry proponents in particular because these parties will consistently play a role in BC’s LNG 
development. 
Provincial Government 
The BC Government is a hierarchical decision-making organization and as such the 
initial consultations may be attended by subordinate representatives. The subordinates or low-
level bureaucrats do not have any decision making authority and typically are in the fact-
gathering role. Gathering facts is an essential part of carrying out the duty to consult because the 
“government is legally required to consult with First Nations and seek to address their concerns 
before impacting claimed or proven aboriginal rights (including title) or treaty rights.”253 Having 
gathered facts on specific consultations the government can make a more informed decision 
including if the appropriate level of consultation has been carried out and if there is an 
accommodation component required to meet their legal duties.254  
 
253 BC Consultation Guide, Supra, note 140  
254 Paraphrased from my class preparation notes for BUS 661 Managing Complexity Within and Beyond 
the Organization, Sept. 2013, based on the Edumine : Practical Tools for Sustainable Relationships in 
Mining found at:http://www.edumine.com/xutility/html/menu.asp?category=xcourse&course=Xout 
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First Nations 
While First Nations look to have a hierarchical, top-down decision-making structure there 
are some cases involving both: traditional (hereditary chiefs) as well as elected leadership (Indian 
Act chiefs) present during the initial consultation phase. There are a myriad of differences in the 
values as they relate to the various BC First Nations’ peoples and cultures. But, a common theme 
among First Nations is being the environmental stewards of the land and being tasked with the 
responsibility to care for the land for future generations.  
As well, First Nations may be accompanied by non-members selected for their expertise 
on specific subjects at negotiations. These agents are only qualified to respond to questions that 
center around their expertise and cannot speak beyond their subject matter, such as making the 
decision to enter into an agreement with a proponent or the Crown. Also First Nations no longer 
regard themselves as “stakeholders” because Section 35 and the current Aboriginal case law 
regard them as “rights’ holders”. So, this is terminology one wants to avoid using when engaging 
First Nations in any conversation around resource development. And as rights’ holders First 
Nations will require the time it takes for a consensual decision-making process to receive the 
approval of its members through ratification or by following the processes of their internal 
decision making.255  
Industry 
The hierarchical decision-making structure of corporations is more likely to be under a 
single authority which will include a Board. The corporation may also appoint representatives 
with sufficient authority to make decisions. The corporation is often the moving party in a multi-
party dispute because they are proposing a particular project or action. But, “any opposition can 
lead to a siege mentality and the sense that those opposed are inherently unreasonable”.256 This 
makes it difficult for the organization’s representative to propose and receive favorable 
consideration of any concessions and changes in their position within their own organization. 
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This is because corporations develop detailed internal positions on issues and proposals which 
make any modifications difficult. Also “[c]ommunication as practiced by energy companies, both 
internally and externally is still too often an exercise in information push meant to control the 
conversation and get people onside."257 The standard corporate attitude continues to be "time is 
money" which works for their internal deliberations but, results in a low tolerance for the time 
requirements of the other outside organizations.258  
The When:  
The “when” I assert is simple. As soon as a proponent has an idea for a project it wants to 
build, then the engagement with First Nations as partners should be a priority. Even case law 
holds that engagement and consultation should begin at the “strategic planning stages”259 so even 
prior to the crown making a final decision on their proposed project. And, I preface the 
aforementioned not only because First Nations have constitutionally guaranteed rights under 
Section 35260 but because it is the right thing to do; being good neighbors is one common sense 
principle to employ when engaging with First Nations. It is also advantageous to utilize this 
approach to build relationships that go beyond the business realm as this can create goodwill 
which will assist the LNG proponents with maintaining their Social License to Operate.  
The How:  
The “how” of resolving complex issues with many stakeholders or rights’ holders 
involves developing a framework that will meet their needs and interests that are specific to BC 
LNG resource developments. “Energy use and development have become topical political, 
environmental and economic issues in Canada, particularly the extraction and transport of oil and 
natural gas.”261 Being able to resolve these issues with many stakeholders or “creating processes 
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for problems”262 is achieved by developing the consensus approach to resolving the complications 
of topics with many stakeholders. There are four steps to the consensus process.263 Phase 1: 
Assessment of potential interest in participation. Phase 2: Convene the process and draft the 
ground rules. Phase 3: Managing the process/crafting the agreement. And, Phase 4: Implementing 
the agreement and monitoring the results.  
Under phase 1, there is the partnerships and relationship building. It must be made clear 
to all of the potential parties that the consensus approach is a voluntary process. The consensus 
approach temporarily levels the playing field by suspending power imbalances for as long as the 
process continues. This means that all participants are equal and have to take an active role in 
understanding the other parties’ interests to forge new relationships. Being able to understand the 
values that the other side brings to the discussion will help in creating an overall understanding 
within the process. For industry “listening to the other party’s concern is less risky than ignoring 
them.”264 This can take place with effective communication strategies and being cognizant of 
other peoples’ communication strategies to reduce conflicts. This will ensure that the participants 
are building new relationships and these relationships will be maintained throughout the entire 
consensus process. And, within the first phase there is getting together to “talk about talking” 
which will help in developing the consensus approach because “nothing but an evening can be 
lost by talking about whether to go on talking.”265  
Phase 2: Convene the process and draft the ground rules. Once the parties have agreed to 
the consensus building approach to resolve their issues the process begins with framing how the 
discussions will happen throughout the consensus approach by laying out ground rules which will 
ensure that discussions remain productive. “Many attempts to resolve conflicts fail not because of 
lack of will to agree or a lack of skills but because the participants have failed to define and agree 
on the process”.266 While convening their process is the best time to go over the roles and 
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responsibilities so that there is structure to the meetings and dialogues. There should be a clear 
definition of what the issues are and the goals & objectives of the consensual process, because 
this will ensure that the meetings will stay on point and everyone knows what they are trying to 
accomplish.  
Next is Phase 3: Managing the process and crafting the agreement. When crafting an 
agreement one should be able to identify the essential interests of the parties. Interests are what is 
important to each party and what motivates them. Interests are what underlie the positions that 
parties take within the negotiation process and a good strategy is to become aware of their 
interests so you can offer a solution. Also, look at making the dispute bigger to allow for 
accommodating the interests of every party that is involved in the process. And, recognize that 
there may be a need for some caucus discussions or joint proposals and submissions. Once they 
believe they are coming to a solution that all can agree to they should define and confirm the 
consensus agreement in writing. 
Finally, there is Phase 4: Implementing the agreement and monitoring the results. This is 
where anticipating everything that can go wrong is very important. Things to be considered are 
the costs of implementation, participation in the implementation and if necessary, a process for 
reviewing and revisions of the agreement. Addressing these types of things will help ensure the 
agreement moves smoothly through the implementation phase. 
The Why: 
The why is because at the end of a successful consensus process, each party can sustain 
their values and the belief that opponents' values have less merit. What is required is not a 
conversion of values but a tolerance for other values and respect for the people who hold them. 
The goal is to try to develop outcomes that enable the parties to live together in spite of their 
differences, not to eliminate these differences. Values define who we are and BC First Nations 
have a wide range of values within their own communities as well as illustrating the differences 
between all of the other First Nations. This will become evident when the “Spectra Energy and 
the BG Group engages the approximately 20 potentially-impacted Aboriginal groups before they 
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start building their gas pipeline from northeastern British Columbia to the Port of Prince 
Rupert”.267 
The previous discussion illustrates how divergent viewpoints can create irreconcilable 
differences between the BC First Nations and the LNG industry proponents resulting in a 
situation where continuing to participate in the standard consultation process is no longer an 
option. This outcome can result from a simple difference on the perspective of time. Where the 
LNG proponents believe that time is of the essence, whereas, the BC First Nations believe 
making the right decision is more important regardless of the time constraints. In getting beyond 
how the dispute began the LNG proponents can find themselves in a position where they need to 
resolve their issue by using the consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues. This 
approach allows for many stakeholders to participate in developing a “process for problems” that 
will use a consensus approach to resolve their issues. This section reviews the potential 
participants in the consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues which includes: the 
provincial government, First Nations and Industry. Obviously, there will be times when there will 
be many stakeholders involved with this process but, the review focuses on the three parties that 
will have a consistent role to play in BC’s LNG development. The analysis then examines the 
“when”, the “how”(the process will work) and “why” to use the consensus approach to resolve 
complex issues with many stakeholders or rights’ holders involved with BC’s LNG resource 
developments. The goal of the consensus process is about building bridges to resolve the issues 
between the various stakeholders and is not about converting the participants’ values or beliefs.  
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Chapter 5.  
Conclusions  
This paper examines the BC LNG developments that need to occur for Canada to 
maintain its energy resource exports. As part of the review it becomes evident that international 
LNG resource companies will be coming to BC to develop this resource. This paper’s focus is to 
assist the industry in developing an engagement strategy to foster working relations with BC First 
Nations. The previous sections of this paper provides the LNG resource companies with general 
guidelines to follow enabling their development of an effective engagement strategy with BC 
First Nations. An underlying value integral to their success is that the LNG proponents need to 
have early and open discussions with the various rights holders and stakeholders.  
Chapter one reviews CSR initiatives and highlights the need for the LNG proponents to 
gain their Social License to Operate because this policy allows corporations to adapt to the 
changes that stakeholders are creating in the social and political fields in which they will operate. 
And, as illustrated by engaging with the Haisla Nation early in the process, Kitimat LNG has 
secured a partner in (a strategic relationship) and advocate for the project, and established the 
company’s social license to operate in the Haisla’s territory. The Kitimat LNG’s success is 
directly related to having prompt and candid discussions about their project with the local First 
Nation whose traditional territory will be the future site of their development.   
Evidently, the courts agree with an early engagement process for the LNG proponents as 
they carry out the consultation and accommodation doctrine requirements when dealing with BC 
First Nations’ interests in the land. Having competing interests in the land require the LNG 
proponents to not only engage early but they also need to listen to the First Nations’ responses on 
how their Aboriginal title and rights will be potentially impacted by the proposed LNG 
developments. This can require the LNG proponents to make changes to their original plans in 
order to mitigate any of the First Nations’ concerns, which further demonstrate the need for early 
engagements. Another option for gaining First Nations’ consent is the LNG proponents can use 
any of the existing economic partnerships based on pre-existing Aboriginal title and rights that 
are currently available in BC. However, the LNG proponents should not overlook the fact that 
early engagement with BC First Nations based on the consultation and accommodation doctrine 
requirements can also help to develop working relationships as the two parties will be having 
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candid discussions to ensure that both parties have a complete understanding of the project’s 
requirements.  
Although, industry believes BC First Nations’ treaties provide “the best and preferred 
way to establish a legal framework to clarify the attributes and geographical extent of Aboriginal 
rights, contributing to a more stable, competitive, and predictable environment for economic and 
resource development.”268 The reality is that there are few treaties in BC, which means that the 
LNG proponents will have to work with First Nations that are using any of the five governance 
models available to them. With the LNG proponents using the principal value that is gaining 
success by having early and open discussions about their projects with the various First Nations 
in BC they will learn which governance model they are currently using. However, given the long 
duration associated with the LNG projects the proponents need to understand that the First 
Nations’ governance models can change because they have the inherent right to be self-
governing.269 This will ensure that any agreements between the parties are taking the First 
Nations’ governance issues into account by providing room for their growth. 
Finally, the underlying value of early and open discussions about the LNG proponents’ 
projects also holds merit with when they need to resolve outstanding issues by using the 
consensus approach to resolving multi-stakeholder issues. Even though different perspectives are 
contributing factors to needing the consensus approach the LNG proponents should understand 
that resolving multi-stakeholder issues will take time. And, the proponents will benefit from their 
timely and frank discussions because this approach will provide some extra time for developing a 
process for resolving their problems. To be effective the process to resolving multi-stakeholder 
issues will have to address the various stakeholders’ interests.   
 
 
 
268  Eyford Comprehensive Claims, Supra, note 238 at page 37. 
269 Included in the the inherent right to be self-governing is the possibility of other models of First Nations’ 
governance being added to the five models that are currently available within the constitutional and 
legislative frameworks of Canada.  
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